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INTRODUCTION

The discussion of search in patent law always focuses on one
particular model of search: producers of commercial products are
supposed to identify the patents that their products might infringe
and then negotiate a license from the owners of those patents. This
one-sided view of search responsibility is most evident in doctrine. As
a doctrinal matter, patent law imposes an absolute duty on the
producer of a commercial product to find all relevant patents and
obtain licenses from each of the owners before commencing
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manufacture. Failure to meet this duty is punished by liability for
infringement, where ignorance of the patent is no excuse.'
The one-sided view of search, however, is treated as far more
than simply a matter of doctrine. Numerous prominent commentators
have sharply criticized the current doctrine. 2 In what has become
known as the "patent thicket" literature, these critics argue that
producers face excessively high search costs because a commercial
product is often covered by thousands of overlapping patents and
finding every last patent is impossible. The irony of this critique is
that these critics still adopt a one-sided view of search, in that they
only ever examine the costs and difficulties of producers finding
patentees. Once the critics conclude that this one particular type of
search is too expensive, they immediately conclude that all searching
is impossible.3
The point of this Article is that search is reciprocal. In
designing a patent system, we can require producers to look for
patentees, or we can require patentees to look for producers. Either
will achieve the goal of an ex ante licensing negotiation that patent
search is designed to facilitate. There is no intrinsic reason that
patent law must prefer to place the search obligation on one side or
the other. The choice is a matter of system design.
Once we appreciate this reciprocity point, it becomes clear that
the existing patent search literature has missed half of the equation.
There is extensive literature on whether it is feasible, sensible, and
efficient to require producers to look for patentees. There is almost no
literature on whether it is feasible, sensible, or efficient to make

1.
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) (stating that
patent infringement is a strict liability offense).
2.
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 71-72 (2008) (arguing that the current
patent system suffers from a problem of "[h]igh search costs"); MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 53 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV 783, 797 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119 (2000); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW POLICY 6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.govos
/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (stating that in certain industries such as computer hardware and
software, a company must "hack" its way through a dense web of overlapping intellectual
property rights in order to successfully commercialize a new product).
3.
As a consequence, they argue for a liability rule regime that does not require search.
See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV.
175 (2011) (arguing for judicially imposed compulsory licenses); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 2,
at 799-800.
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patentees look for producers.4 But unless one considers patentee
search costs as well as producer search costs, it is altogether
premature to conclude that all search is hopeless, as the current
literature is wont to do. The first contribution of this Article is to
argue that discussions of patent search should consider both sides of
the equation.
A close analogy to this point is Ronald Coase's famous insight
in tort law.5 Prior to Coase, the intuitive belief was that causation was
one sided.6 That is, when a driver crashes into a pedestrian, people
intuitively blame the driver for causing the accident and therefore
focus on measures to adjust the driver's behavior (e.g., by imposing
penalties for bad driving). In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase
observed that causation is reciprocal: both drivers and pedestrians can
take measures to avoid accidents.7 Drivers can drive more slowly, and
pedestrians can walk more carefully. There is no intrinsic reason for
the law to consider only measures that would affect driver behavior.
The corollary to the reciprocity insight is that law should place
the duty on the party with the lower cost. In tort law, this was Guido
Calabresi's famous follow-up to Coase.8 Once we appreciate that both
drivers and pedestrians can take measures to avoid accidents,
Calabresi argued that the duty to take precautions should be allocated
to the least cost avoider.9 At a doctrinal level, tort law had already
implemented this insight through the doctrine of contributory
negligence, which imposes a duty on victims to take precautions when

4.
Jonathan Masur comes close with his recent article, Patent Liability Rules as Search
Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (2011). The difference is that Masur focuses his discussion on
patentees searching for infringers after infringement has already occurred, while my focus is on
ex ante searches for producers before they begin infringing. As I discuss in Part III.A infra, this
ex ante/ex post difference is crucial, because it is often too late for efficient negotiation if
infringement has already occurred.
5.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6.
See Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 738 (2005) (recounting
how the reciprocity point was so counter-intuitive at the time that a professor told him it was
wrong and made him remove the argument from an article); see also Todd S. Aagaard,

Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1505, 1558 (2011) ("Coase's observation of the reciprocity of causation in land-use conflicts is
simple, but it differs dramatically from the traditional and intuitive conceptualization of such
conflicts.. . .").
7.
Coase, supra note 5, at 13 (making the point in the context of a rancher's cattle
trampling a farmer's crops).
8.
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 13540 (1970).
9.
Id. (creating the concept of the "cheapest cost avoider").
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they can do so at the lower cost.' 0 Calabresi provided the theoretical
foundation for explaining the economic function of this doctrine.
In similar vein, the second novel contribution of this Article is
the argument that we should allocate the duty of search to the lowercost searcher, and patentees will at least sometimes-indeed, likely
very often-be the lower-cost searchers. As the existing literature has
shown, producers often face extraordinary difficulties finding
patentees because there are often thousands of relevant patents
covering a single product and these thousands of patents are hidden in
a thicket of two million issued and unexpired patents." At a first
approximation, if there are a small number of well-known producers
(e.g., a few large companies dominate an industry) but thousands of
small and unknown patentees, then it would be more efficient to have
patentees look for producers than to have producers look for
patentees.
If we followed the script of the tort analogy, the doctrinal
response would then be to impose a "contributory search" defense. I
outline how such a defense would work in Part III. Importantly, an
efficient search regime does not require knowing ahead of time who
the lower-cost searcher is, just as nobody knows ahead of time
whether a driver or a pedestrian is the lower-cost avoider of an
accident. By imposing the duty on the least cost searcher as
determined ex post, the law creates the incentive among parties to
each perform efficient searches ex ante as a precaution against
potential liability, in the same way that imposing negligence liability
ex post encourages efficient precautions ex ante in tort law.
Although a contributory search defense creates the most
elegant incentives from a theoretical standpoint, it lacks statutory
support and requires highly individualized case-by-case adjudication.
Thus, in Part IV I also provide a more practical, though less
theoretically perfect, mechanism for reallocating the search burden
through 35 U.S.C. § 287. The point is that § 287 on its face requires

10. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 467 (1934) (describing how, with certain
exceptions, a plaintiffs own negligence bars recovery against a negligent defendant who
otherwise would have been liable).
11. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1117 & n.99 (2003); see also Jay P. Kesan et al., Paving the Path to

Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A Comment on Professor Chien's Predicting Patent
Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 97, 101 (2012) (noting there are approximately two million
patents in effect).
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patentees to give notice to producers,12 but courts have interpreted
this provision narrowly because it lies in tension with the dominant
assumption that producers must find patentees. Giving § 287 a more
robust application would thus partially reallocate the search duty
from producers to patentees, though not with the same theoretical
elegance as a contributory search defense.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, I explain how the
existing literature and case law reflect a one-sided view of search. In
Part II, I point out that search is in fact reciprocal, with the corollary
that we should allocate the search duty to the lower-cost searcher. In
Part III, I describe how this can be implemented through a
contributory search defense, akin to how the contributory negligence
defense achieves this function in tort law. Because the contributory
search defense lacks statutory support, however, Part IV provides an
alternative doctrinal mechanism to implement the reciprocity insight,
through the existing provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 287. In Part V, I
consider how the reciprocity insight might have application outside of
patent law, most importantly in the analogous domain of copyrights. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. THE ONE-SIDED VIEW OF SEARCH
A. The Role of Search
In order to see why the fallacy of one-sided producer search
matters, it is helpful to see first why search matters. It is usually
taken for granted that having low patent search costs is important
and desirable. It is rarely elaborated as to why. The reason goes to the
fundamental nature of patents as property rights. A brief discussion of
the dichotomy of property rules versus liability rules is therefore
required.
As Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed explained, property
rules and liability rules are alternative ways for the legal system to
determine the value of social resources such as land or inventions.13 A
property rule determines the value of a social resource by forcing the
parties to negotiate.14 In practical terms, this is usually achieved by
12.

See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Under
a patentee that sells its patented product within the United States must provide actual
or constructive notice of the patent to the accused infringer to qualify for damages.").
13. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
14. Id. at 1092.

§ 287(a)
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conferring a right to injunctive relief. 15 By giving the owner of
Blackacre an absolute right to Blackacre (backed by an injunction
against unconsented takings), the law forces anyone who wishes to use
Blackacre to negotiate with the owner and pay a mutually agreed
price. The market mechanism therefore determines the value of
Blackacre.
Search plays an essential role in a property-rule regime
because, in order for the parties to negotiate, they must find each
other first.16 And it is important to note that property rules require

the negotiation to occur before the buyer takes the property: if I want
to use Blackacre, the expectation is that I would purchase it first,
before moving in.17 This ex ante point applies equally to patent law.
What patent law seeks to achieve is not a negotiation that occurs after
the producer has independently developed a product and started
infringing-that result is wasteful and inefficient. Rather, the point of
patent law is to incentivize a negotiation beforehand, so that an
inventor who has a brilliant idea but no capital can team together
with a producer who has a comparative advantage in manufacturing
and marketing, in order to bring the idea to market and allow both the
inventor and the producer to share the profit.18 Thus, when I refer to
"search" in this Article, I mean ex ante searches.
Another way to understand the importance of ex ante
negotiation in a property-rule system is to consider what happens if
the negotiation occurs ex post, after the property rule has already
been violated. If I build a house on Blackacre without purchasing it
beforehand and then approach the owner to negotiate, a phenomenon
known as "holdup" occurs. Stated simply, holdup is the increased
leverage that comes from the fact that the property has been improved
15. Id. at 1127 (noting that property rules are usually supported by injunctions and/or
criminal penalties for violation).
16. See id. (pointing out that we use liability rules for car accidents because drivers and
pedestrians cannot find each other ahead of time to negotiate); see also Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997) (calling this difficulty of "having to
find and assemble numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties" a "Type I" transaction
cost).
17. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1108 (noting that a property entitlement
against accidental injuries would require purchase of the right to injure before the accident
occurred).
18. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in

NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962) (noting the disclosure paradox that would
occur without patent protection, where a manufacturer would not agree to license an idea
without knowing what it was buying, but once the idea was disclosed the manufacturer would
lose the incentive to pay for it).
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and that this improvement cannot be undone. 19 After I have already
built the house, the price that the owner will demand for Blackacre
increases because the land now has a brand new house on it and the
house cannot be moved. 20 This ex post value exceeds the ex ante "true"
value of Blackacre (i.e., the value of the land and not the house) that a
property rule is designed to measure. Similarly, once a producer has
made fixed investments in an invention, such as building a factory to
commercialize it, the ex post value of a license will reflect the value of
the factory, not the inventive idea by itself.21
Holdup is usually considered deeply unfair. 22 A more
economically oriented way of expressing this unfairness is that it
deters productive improvement of property. 2 3If I must effectively pay
for the house (or the factory) twice-once to build it, and a second time
to buy it back from the owner of Blackacre (or the patentee)-I am less
likely to build the house (or commercialize the invention), which is a
productive use of Blackacre (or the inventive idea).24 Of course, one
response is that I should buy Blackacre before building a house on it,
but it is important to see that this intuitive response requires an
embedded assumption that the owner and I can find each other ahead
of time to negotiate. 25 The smooth functioning of a property rule is
thus extremely dependent on this type of ex ante search being feasible
or, in economic terms, cheap.
An alternative way of determining the value of property is not
to negotiate for it, but simply to have a judge order the transfer at a
judicially determined price. 2 6 This alternative turns the notion of
"property" on its head, but it is what happens in an eminent domain
proceeding. 27 The government first unilaterally takes the land and
puts a government building on it, and then has a judge determine the
19. Benjamin Klein, TransactionCost Determinantsof "Unfair"ContractualArrangements,
70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356-57 (1980) (emphasizing the requirement of "highly firm-specific
investments").
20. This is not because of the "sunk cost fallacy," but because the land has been improved.
21. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 125 (describing the holdup problem).
22. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (arguing that holdup gives patentees "undue leverage in negotiations" that allow
them to "charge exorbitant fees").
23. Klein, supra note 19, at 357 ("For example, one would not build a house on land rented
for a short term. After the rental agreement expires, the landowner could raise the rental price
to reflect the costs of moving the house to another lot.").
24. Id.
25. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1127 (noting transaction costs, and in
particular search costs, as the determinant between property rules and liability rules).
26. Id. at 1092 (defining liability rules).
27. Id. at 1106-07 (giving eminent domain as an example of a liability rule).
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"just compensation" that must be paid to the original owners. 28 This is
what Calabresi and Melamed define as a "liability rule" regime. 29
A liability rule does not require search because it does not
require ex ante negotiation. A judge can determine the true value (i.e.,
the value of Blackacre without the building) in an ex post setting. In
this way, liability rules are more efficient in situations where ex ante
search costs are very high.30 But liability rules also have a downside,
which is that they require judges to determine the value of property.31
Courts are not institutionally well equipped to perform this task, so a
judge trying to determine the value of Blackacre, or the value of an
invention, will often get it wrong.3 2 Indeed, the entire premise of the
patent system is that judges cannot accurately measure the value of
inventions; if they could, it would be more efficient to abolish patents
completely and award taxpayer-funded cash prizes instead.33 For this
reason, patent law has always used a property-rule system (backed by
a strong right to injunctions) that forces the parties to engage in ex
ante negotiations to determine value.3" Therefore, search matters to
patent law because it is essential to the smooth functioning of any
property-rule system.

28.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

29.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106-07.
30. Id. at 1127; see also Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property
Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 274 (2002)
(arguing that although transaction costs are often stated to be the determinant, this requires an
implicit assumption about judicial assessment costs).
31. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 453-55 (1995) (discussing judicial
"assessment costs").
32. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092-94 (1998) (arguing that "liability rules ... require 0 some level of state
intervention in each and every transaction to set the appropriate value for the parties" and the
"risk of undercompensation in such situations is pervasive"); see also THOMAS J. MICELI, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 157 (2009) (costs of liability rules include "litigation costs and the
possibility of court error in setting damages").
33. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1844 (1984) ("In theory, direct reward systems are preferable .... A central reason for reliance
on a patent system is that it is thought to be too difficult to determine the appropriate level of
reward fairly and accurately on a case-by-case basis."); see also Michael Kremer, PatentBuyouts:
A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1140 (1998) ("[Flinancing
research with monopoly profits . . . is generically less efficient than financing research through
tax revenue.").
34.
See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp.
1354, 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The injunction creates a property right and leads
to negotiations between the parties. A private outcome of these negotiations . . . is much
preferable to a judicial guesstimate about what a royalty should be.").
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B. The Conventional One-Sided View
In Calabresi and Melamed's original formulation of a property
rule, they did not specify which party had to conduct a search.
According to Calabresi and Melamed: "If we were to give victims a
property entitlement not to be accidentally injured we would have to
require all who engage in activities that may injure them to negotiate
with them before an accident."35 Thus, while Calabresi and Melamed
envisioned a duty on defendants to negotiate, they did not explicitly
say that it was defendants who must find plaintiffs to initiate that
negotiation.
Subsequent authors, however, have always reflexively assumed
that, because the defendant must negotiate with a plaintiff under a
property rule, the defendant also bears the burden of search. 36 As the
remainder of this Section will discuss, this assumption is built so
deeply into the fabric of patent law that not only does the doctrine
reflect this assumption, but the critics of the doctrine subscribe to it as
well.
1. The Doctrine that Requires Producers to Search
The standard doctrine imposes a duty on producers to search
for patentees. This comes from the fact that patent infringement is a
strict liability offense. 37 That is, anyone who makes, uses, or sells
something that is covered by a patent will infringe, even if he is
unaware of the patent. 38 Because patent law uses infringement
liability to punish a producer who fails to find the patentee (and
obtain a license), it effectively imposes the duty of search on
producers. 39
On the other side, patent law imposes no duty of search on
patentees. Indeed, patentees are free to do nothing without
jeopardizing their legal rights. 40 Of course, some patentees will
35. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1108 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., MICELI, supra note 32, at 157 (arguing that a property right against being
injured by railways would necessarily imply that railroad companies must "identify and
negotiate with all potential accident victims" (emphasis added)).
37. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
38. See Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 575, 582 (1852) ("Patents are public records. All
persons are bound to take notice of their contents.").
39. See Masur, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that patent law's substantive liability rules also
function as search rules, in that they allocate search duties and costs).
40. Contl Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag. Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (" 'The inventor is
one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold the
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voluntarily search for and approach potential producers to offer them
licenses,41 but there is no law that requires it.42 The vision of search is
therefore one sided: the law requires producers to search, but it does
not require patentees to do so.
This one-sided view of search is further reinforced by the fact
that the law does require patentees to help producers find them. That
is, the law requires patentees to make the patent document clear and
understandable,43 and to record their contact information4 4 So that the
owner of a patent can be easily found. But this still reflects a one-sided
view of search. Producers are required to actively look for patentees,
akin to the tradition of men asking women to dance, while patentees
are shy wallflowers who passively wait to be asked (and have to dress
in a way as to get noticed). Nothing requires patentees to search in an
active way-judges do not even imagine the possibility-just as no
Victorian could imagine women asking men to dance.
Patent law maintains this configuration of duties (producers to
search, patentees to passively wait) even when it is far easier for
patentees to find producers and initiate negotiations than vice versa.
The most extreme example is Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies
AG.4 5 In Rambus, the patentee (Rambus Inc.) had a patent application
covering a type of memory technology called SDRAM.46 At the same
time, the computer industry had a joint committee, known as JEDEC,
that was developing standards for memory technology.47 Rambus was
a member of this committee, but it did not tell anyone that it had a
patent related to this area. 4 8 The committee eventually settled on
knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which
the statute promises to him.' " (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 249
(1897)) (emphasis added)).
41. F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional
Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 396 (2006)
(pointing out that "patents are wasting assets" and, therefore, patentees have some economic
incentive to find potential licensees).
42. To elaborate: Saying that patentees have an inbuilt incentive to search is like saying
that pedestrians have an inbuilt incentive to walk carefully. The problem is not that there are no
inbuilt incentives at all, but that the inbuilt incentives are not enough. The fact that pedestrians
have some inbuilt incentive to walk carefully does not mean that imposing absolute liability on
drivers is efficient.
43. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (stating there is "no excuse for ambiguous
language or vague descriptions" in patents).
44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(c)(1) (2012) (requiring a patent applicant to record his address).
45. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG (Rambus 1), 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
46. Id. at 1084-85.
47. Id. at 1085.
48. Id. ("Rambus did not disclose any patent applications to JEDEC.").

12

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 1: 1

SDRAM as the standard, and thus everyone in the industry started
making irreversible fixed investments (e.g., building factories) on a
technology that infringed Rambus's patent.49
Once the other members had made irreversible investments,
Rambus sued everyone for infringement and obtained hefty
royalties. 50 This is a classic holdup strategy: after an unknowing
producer has made irreversible fixed investments in the property
(here the patented technology), the patent owner can obtain more in
royalties than it could in an ex ante negotiation. 51 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Rambus. 52 Later, in a
separate proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission, the
D.C. Circuit also ruled for Rambus. 53
Rambus illustrates how far the law insists on its configuration
of duties, where producers have a duty to search and patentees have
none, even when the relative burdens of compliance are mismatched.
For producers like the defendant, Infineon, it was literally impossible
to find Rambus's patent application, because an unissued patent
application (which Rambus had) is confidential by law. 54 But once the
computer industry made irreversible fixed investments, Rambus then
allowed its patent to issue,55 and at this point the industry was made
to pay for its ignorance. Conversely, for the patentee Rambus, finding
the producers and initiating negotiations would have cost almost
nothing at all since Rambus was already a member of the committee.
All it would have had to do is tell the committee about its pending
patent application (the statute bars the patent office but not the
patentee from disclosing a pending application). Rambus did not do so,
however, because it was not legally required to do so,5 6 and because it
49. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (finding infringement).
50. See Tony Smith, Rambus' "Very High" DDR Royalty Revealed, REGISTER (May 3, 2001),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/05/03/rambus-very-high._ddr-royalty/
(discussing
that
Rambus charged a royalty of 3.5% for patents covering the standard, but only 0.75% for other
patents).
51. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
52. Rambus I, 318 F.3d at 1106-07 (ruling for Rambus on infringement and fraud issues).
53. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006). The statute does require the publication of an unissued
application after eighteen months, but only if the patent applicant files the application
internationally. Id.
55. Through a variety of procedural mechanisms, most particularly the "continuation"
application, patentees have tremendous control over the timing of when their patent will issue.
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,84
B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004) (discussing the continuation application process).
56. Ram bus 1, 318 F.3d at 1100-02 (finding Rambus had no duty to disclose its claims).
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was more profitable for Rambus to wait until the industry had made
irreversible fixed investments before disclosing its patent.
Similar, if less extreme, examples of well-known producers
being held up by previously unknown patentees abound.57 The most
famous is probably NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.,68 where the
maker of the Blackberry device was sued by a previously unknown
entity named NTP, Inc. 59 Because Research in Motion ("RIM') had
made irreversible investments in the Blackberry while ignorant of the
NTP patent,60 NTP could threaten to shut down the entire Blackberry
business with an injunction. 61 RIM was forced to pay $612.5 million to
avoid a shutdown of its business.62 Once again, the doctrine effectively
requires producers to find every patentee ahead of time, even if
producer search is impossibly difficult (there are over six thousand
known patents covering different components in 3G smartphones, 63
plus a potentially even larger number of unknown patents) and
patentee search would likely be much easier. It effectively imposes
this duty because it levies draconian sanctions (e.g., $612.5 million) for
failure to comply.
2. The Literature that Proposes Helping Producers to Search
If the law imposes a duty on producers to search (and not only
to search, but to successfully find), but compliance is very difficult or
impossible, how should this contradiction be resolved? One solution
that is often contemplated in the literature is to make producer search
easier by improving the surrounding infrastructure. Proposals to
publish patent applications earlier, 64 to have patent boundaries

57. Although industry participants knew of Rambus's existence, they did not know that
Rambus had a patent. In this sense Rambus was an unknown patentee. More often, even the
person's existence is unknown.
58. 418 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting
that RIM invented its technology independently, before it knew of NTP or its patent).
60. Id.
61. Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643,
1653 (2010).
62. Id.
63. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 2026 (2007).
64. See, e.g., Paul M. Schoenhard, Reconceptualizing Inventive Conception: Strengthening,
Not Abandoning, the First-to-Invent System, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 567, 598-99 (2008) (arguing to
publish patent applications immediately upon filing).
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marked more clearly, 65 and to have better patent databases, 66
routinely arise in the literature.67
The important point for purposes of my discussion is that these
proposals all embody a one-sided view of search. The focus is always
on measures that allow producers to find patentees. Nobody ever
discusses making patentees look for producers. There are no
proposals, for example, to compile databases of commercial products
and their producers so that patentees can find them-only for
databases of patents and their owners that producers can search.
The corollary is that these one-sided proposals are often very
inefficient and ineffective if our goal is to achieve ex ante negotiation
of patent licenses. For example, publishing patent applications early
would have made it easier for the memory-chip producers in Rambus
to find Rambus's patent application ahead of time. That does not
mean it would have been easy. The change is instead from literally
impossible (the application is made secret by law) to merely almost
impossible (the application is buried in a pile along with 1.1 million
other pending applications, 68 plus over two million issued and
unexpired patents).69 Compare this to how easy it would have been for
Rambus to find the very memory-chip producers that it sat with on the
same standard-setting committee. 70
3. The Literature that Argues Producers Cannot Search
Thus far, I have discussed existing doctrine and proposals to
polish and improve it, which both embrace the one-sided view of
search. But the deeply ingrained nature of this one-sided view is most

65. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent
Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975-78
(2005) (arguing for more "refinement" of patent claims).
66. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromner, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 585-86 (2009)
(proposing to improve patent databases with better indexing).
67. See also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 235-48 (providing numerous suggestions
to make it easier for producers to find and analyze patents).
68. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 161 (2011), available at www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/
USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf.
69. Kesan et al., supra note 11, at 101.
70. Cf. DOUG LICHTMAN, PATENT HOLDOUTS IN THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS, ACAD.
ADVISORY COUNCIL BULL. 1.3, at 9 (2006), available at http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/iplbulletins/bulletinl.3patent.pdf (arguing that courts should consider "the ease with which
the patent holder could have announced its patent before firms invested in the standard").
Although Lichtman seems to thereby consider the possibility of patentee search, the rest of his
paper focuses on producer search concerns.
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ironically revealed when we consider the existing doctrine's fiercest
critics. Numerous authors including Mark Lemley, Carl Shapiro,
Michael Heller, James Besson, and Michael Meurer have all criticized
patent law's search doctrine in harsh terms.71 These critics argue that
producers face almost insuperable difficulties in finding all the
relevant patentees because there are too many patents for producers
to wade through. In short, they argue that producer search will always
be incredibly onerous no matter how much we tinker with the
infrastructure. With this initial premise I fully agree.
As Mark Lemley and Phillip Weiser note, there are "literally
thousands" of patents that cover 3G telephone systems, 72 and these
patents are hidden in a thicket of over two million issued and
unexpired patents. 73 For a producer like RIM to find all these patents
ahead of time would be almost impossible.74 Of course, it might have
been possible for RIM to find a few of those patents, and thus it might
have found NTP's in particular. But as long as it could not find every
such patent, another plaintiff would have come along and sued. From
RIM's perspective, whether the plaintiff is named "NT P" or "Company
X" is obviously irrelevant. The point is that, unless a producer can find
every patent ahead of time, it faces the possibility that it will be held
up by some unknown plaintiff.
The 3G smartphone market is not alone in facing patent
thickets. 75 The same problem afflicts nearly every modern device,
virtually all of which contain thousands of individual components that
may each be covered by one or more patents. To produce the finished
commercial product requires a license to every one of those hundreds
or thousands of patents. If the producer misses even a single patent
and does not procure a license ahead of time, then it faces the
possibility of being held up later.76

71.
See sources cited supra note 2 (analyzing the shortcomings of the current patent search
system).
72.
Lemley & Weiser, supranote 2, at 797.
Lemley & Tangri, supranote 11, at 1117 & n.99; see also Kesan et al., supra note 11, at
73.
101.
74.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 68-71 (discussing the "patent flood" as a
reason for patent clearance becoming less feasible).
75.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 2025-29 (describing the large numbers of
overlapping patents covering products such as 3G smartphones, Wi-Fi devices, DVD players, and
radio-frequency identification devices).
76. Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software
Patents, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249, 270 (2005) (noting a single patent can hold up the
industry).
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Limited proposals such as improving patent databases and
publishing patents earlier are unlikely to overcome this basic problem
of scale. To take a simple example, a producer like RIM in the
smartphone industry may begin by searching all the patents that are
classified under the category of "telephones," or "wireless technology,"
to see if its product infringes. But in order to make a smartphone, it
also needs an LCD screen, a plastic cover, and screws. Each of those
components might also be patented. So RIM would have to search
through patents on displays, on chemistry, and on fasteners. 7
Additionally, a smartphone needs a processor and software, so RIM
has to search all computer hardware and software patents. The
enormous number of patents in multiple technology sectors that RIM
must wade through in order to conduct a comprehensive clearance
search makes the thousands of patents it must actually license seem
small by comparison.78 And this same logic applies to virtually every
modern device, such as a computer, television, or car (the GPS in the
car, alone, would be rather akin to a smartphone).
The patent thicket literature thus makes a fully justified point
that producer search is impossibly onerous in many cases, in that
producers cannot find every single patent that covers their products.
This literature is entirely correct that the doctrine requiring producers
to find every single patent is demanding the impossible. But this
literature still shares the one-sided view of search because it cannot
imagine any other form of search. Once the critics conclude that it is
impossible for producers to find patentees, they immediately argue
that the only way to avoid holdup is for courts to deny injunctions and
impose compulsory licenses that reflect the "fair" value of a patent.79
77. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 69-70 (noting that firms are frequently sued
by patents covering different technology classes and in unrelated industries).
78. See Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-16), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2016968 (estimating that it would take two million patent attorneys
working full time to clear every software product against all the software patents issued in a
given year). The Mulligan and Lee estimate is probably too high, but it illustrates the basic
problem of scale.
79. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3, at 202-04 (arguing for compensation rather than
injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement if the infringer substantially improves the
patented technology); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 2, at 799-800; see also BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 2, at 251-52 (arguing for "calibrat[ing]" remedies, though expressing reservations
about denying injunctions completely). Denying injunctions and awarding compulsory licenses
usually go hand-in-hand, since if the patentee does not receive an injunction, he must be given
alternative compensation, or else the patentee would be left with nothing. But see Stewart E.
Sterk, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About PropertyRights, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1285, 1316-18 (2008) (exploring efficiencies and weaknesses of a no-liability regime for
improvers who infringed on a patent after deciding "reasonably" not to search for such

2013]

THE RECIPROCITY OFSEARCH

17

That is, the patent thicket literature argues for converting the patent
system from a property rule that relies on ex ante search and
negotiation to a liability rule that requires neither search nor
negotiation (since a judge will just impose the license terms ex post by
judicial fiat). The only alternative to the doctrine that requires search
by producers, in the conventional imagination, is no search at all.
II. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF SEARCH

My point in this Part-and indeed this Article-is that
contrary to the universal assumption, search is in fact a reciprocal
task. This insight produces a very different view of the patent thicket
problem. Before directly applying this insight to patent law, it is
useful to consider an analogous context where the literature had
previously treated a reciprocal problem as one sided. Exposing the
fallacy of the one-sided view was the major contribution of Ronald
Coase to tort law.
A. Coase and the Reciprocity of Tort Causation
Suppose that a driver crashes into a pedestrian, causing injury.
As an intuitive matter, people are prone to blame the driver.80 This
means they analyze the problem from the perspective of regulating
driver behavior and imposing duties on drivers. If there were a spate
of driver-pedestrian accidents, there would be many calls for lower
speed limits and increased fines for drunk driving. A functionally
similar solution would be to impose a tax (known as a Pigovian tax) on
gasoline, which would reduce the amount of driving.81 What we are
unlikely to see, however, are proposals to tax or penalize pedestrians.
In his famous article on The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase
showed that this intuitive one-sided view of tort responsibility was
misguided.
infringement). See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 169-70 (2011) ("Many
scholars concerned about patent thickets hail the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., because the Court made it more difficult for patentees to become
hold-outs through threatening or obtaining injunctions.").
80. See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 548 (2003)
(noting that "notions of responsibility are deeply embedded in ordinary English language" and
"[i]n ordinary usage, it would be perfectly appropriate to say that car drivers 'caused' [carbicyclist accidents]").
81. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-93 (Transaction
Publishers 4th ed. 2002) (illustrating taxes as a strategy to rectify the "divergence" between
social and private interests by describing a tax on gasoline).
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Coase's fundamental insight was that causation is reciprocal:
both the driver and pedestrian cause the accident. 82 The driver could
avoid the accident by driving more carefully; but the pedestrian could
also avoid the accident by walking more carefully (or, in the extreme,
not walking at all and staying home). In other words, society could
levy the Pigovian tax or impose tort liability on either party. If we
imposed it on drivers, they would drive less; if we imposed it on
pedestrians, they would walk less. Either method would reduce the
number of driver-pedestrian accidents. This reciprocity insight is
today fundamental to the law-and-economics analysis of tort law. 8 3
The reciprocity of causation leads to an important corollary:
Given that there are two parties who can avoid an accident, who
should take the precaution? In more lawyerly terms, on which party
should the law impose the duty to take the precaution? As Guido
Calabresi later established, the economically efficient tort rule is to
allocate the duty to the least cost avoider.84 The point is that although
causation is reciprocal, the cost of avoidance is not equal in a
particular case. Sometimes it is easier for a driver to avoid an
accident, and other times it is easier for a pedestrian to do so. The
optimal allocation of liability depends on a comparison between the
costs of the two sides, and the resulting solution will vary with each
individual case.
Coase's and Calabresi's contributions each marked a revolution
in the tort literature. But one irony is that their insights did very little
to change doctrine. Although the literature always considered tort
responsibility in a one-sided manner, the doctrine was already
reciprocal in practice. The contributory negligence doctrine already
considered the (pedestrian) victim's conduct, and it already imposed a
duty on pedestrians to take precautions when they were the lower-cost
avoiders. 85 In a similar vein, patentees sometimes do already conduct
Coase, supra note 5, at 2.
82.
83. See J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 210 n.39 (1990)
("[T]he reciprocity of causation and harm first noted by Coase and Calabresi ... is central to the
modern law and economics movement."); Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic
Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 16-17 (1988) (describing the
literature that analyzes strategic actions taken by injurers and accident victims as part of a
"showcase for the new law and economics"). But see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 165 (1973) (rejecting Coasean reciprocity); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S91-S92 (2011)
(noting that "[1]awyers have always had trouble accepting [Coasean reciprocity]").
84. CALABRESI, supranote 8, at 135-40.
85. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 467 (1934); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 88-96 (1987) (describing how the common law
contributory negligence doctrine allocates responsibility to the least cost avoider).
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voluntary searches in real life (though less often than would be
optimal, because of the lack of legal duties and incentives), but this
observation does not defeat my point that the patent literature has
taken a one-sided view of search.
B. The Reciprocity of Patent Search
Applying the analogy of tort causation to patent searches is
straightforward. As seen in Part I, the universal focus of the patent
search literature is on one side of the equation: producers. In fact,
however, the search problem is reciprocal. In order to initiate ex ante
negotiation for a license to a patent, we can have producers find
patentees, or patentees find producers. Thus, just as Coase criticized
Pigou and many others for their one-sided focus, the first point here is
that we must consider both sides of the search equation.
The immediate corollary to the reciprocity insight is that, like
the least-cost-avoider analysis in tort, the optimal allocation of the
search responsibility will depend on a comparison of the two sides.
Sometimes it will be cheap for producers to search for patentees but
expensive for patentees to search for producers. At other times it will
be cheaper for patentees to search for producers.86 The economically
efficient allocation will vary from case to case.
The tort analogy can be seen another way. In negligence law,
what the law is trying to do is to avoid a social loss-the accident that
causes an injury. The reciprocity of tort causation tells us that there
are two parties who each can take precautions to avoid this loss: the
driver can drive more carefully, or the pedestrian can walk more
carefully. The efficient choice depends on a comparison between the
costs of these two precautions. The least cost avoider is the person who
has the lower cost of precaution, and the doctrinal insight is to allocate
the burden of taking precautions to this least cost avoider.
In patent search, what the law is trying to avoid is also a social
loss-the inefficiency of inadvertent infringement and holdup. The
reciprocity of search tells us that there are two parties who each can
take precautions to avoid this loss: the patentee by finding the
producer ex ante, or the producer by finding the patentee ex ante. As
long as the parties find each other before the producer makes the
irreversible fixed investment, there will be no inadvertent

86.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 221, 225 (2011) ("Giving notice of one's own property rights is often far cheaper than
searching for the possible but uncertain rights of others.").
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infringement and no holdup. The efficient choice, once again, depends
on a comparison between the costs of these two precautions.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCITY

The immediate implication of recognizing the reciprocity of
search, as I have described above, is that scholars need to consider
both patentee and producer search costs, because the optimal search
rule is to allocate the duty to the lower-cost searcher. This insight is
important regardless of whether, after empirical study, one ultimately
finds patentees to be the lower- or higher-cost searchers. 8 The
difference is between coming to a conclusion after considering the
question and ignoring the issue altogether, as the literature has done
to date.
My argument in this Part goes further: it is that patentees are
the lower-cost searchers at least some of the time, and likely a
majority of the time. This conclusion is necessarily tentative because
nobody has studied patentee search costs. But if producer search costs
are prohibitively high, as the patent thicket literature has
demonstrated, then there is at least a good possibility that patentee
search costs would be lower in some cases.
If one grants my premise that patentees are sometimes the
lower-cost searchers, then the implication is that the law should
allocate the duty to search to patentees in those particular cases. A
reader does not need to fully agree with me that patentees are the
lower-cost searchers in the majority of cases-it is enough that
patentees are the lower-cost searchers in a nonnegligible percentage of
cases. Such an individualized, case-by-case allocation of the duty to
search would function similarly to the doctrine of contributory
negligence.
A. Defining Ex Ante Search
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize one point about
my analysis: it pertains to ex ante searches. A common reaction to my
proposal to make patentees search is that it would usually be
impossible for patentees to find producers, because patentees cannot
87. One can expect such empirical disagreement since there is disagreement about the
search costs of producers. Compare supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (citing sources
arguing that producer search costs are high), with Kieff, supra note 41, at 395 (describing
producer search costs as low because patents are "relatively clear, certain, and . . . easily
located").
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know about a producers' forthcoming products and producers will hide
their infringing activities. This objection relies on a misunderstanding
of what it means to conduct an ex ante search.
Consider Coase's famous example of a cattle rancher and a
farmer, where the rancher's cattle trample the farmer's crops.*8 After
the rancher's cattle trample the farmer's crops, it goes without saying
that the rancher would have an incentive to hide this fact from the
farmer. But Coase never considers this problem in his analysis. The
famous Coase Theorem simply says that, if transaction costs are low
enough, the rancher and the farmer will negotiate with each other to
arrive at the optimal outcome. So why does Coase not consider the
problem of ex post evasion?
The reason that Coase never considers the possibility that the
rancher might hide his cattle's trampling activities from the farmer is
that it is not relevant at the point in time that he is considering the
problem. The point that Coase was trying to make was that, before the
cattle trample the crops, the rancher and the farmer could negotiate to
achieve the optimal solution. The purpose of the legal system at this
point in time is simply to facilitate the efficient negotiation by
reducing transaction costs. At the ex ante point in time, the rancher
would have no incentive to hide from the farmer, and thus there is no
need to consider this possibility.
Patent law works the same way. The goal of patent law is to
facilitate a transfer between a genius inventor with a brilliant idea
but no capital, and a manufacturer with lots of capital but no ideas, so
that both can share the profit that arises from commercializing the
invention.89 It is not to have an inventor come up with an idea, a
manufacturer to then independently develop the same idea, and then
to have the inventor sue the manufacturer for infringement-such a
result is wasteful and is exactly what ex ante searching is supposed to
prevent.90 In other words, the purpose of patent search is to facilitate
an efficient ex ante negotiation between the two parties, occurring
before the producer independently develops the same invention and
invests resources in infringing activity. At this ex ante point in time,
there is no need to consider the possibility that a producer would hide
from the patentee, because the producer has no incentive to hide and
Coase, supra note 5, at 2-3.
88.
See Arrow, supra note 18, at 614-17 (noting that patents solve the disclosure paradox
89.
that would otherwise frustrate this transaction).
90. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 278 (1977) (arguing that one function of the patent system is to prevent wasteful
duplication).
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no infringing activities to hide. 9 ' In this way, a patentee would not be
looking for infringing activity in order to determine whom to contact,
but rather looking for potential cooperative producers. For example, if
I hold a microprocessor patent, the point of an ex ante search is not to
investigate whether Intel and AMD are on the verge of commencing
infringement, but to contact those producers because they are large
chip manufacturers who have the resources and expertise to
commercialize the invention. This understanding of ex ante search
answers the objection that patentees would be unable to search for
producers ex ante because they would lack adequate information. The
information that patentees would need-namely, whether a producer
is a company with expertise and resources in the general technological
area of the invention-is usually public and well known.
In theory, the cutoff point between "ex ante" and "ex post"
search is the investment of substantial fixed costs toward infringing
activity. 92 Once a producer invests substantial fixed costs (e.g., builds
a factory tailored to the particular invention), he has an incentive to
hide from the patentee even if the actual infringement by making and
selling products has not yet commenced. Moreover, once substantial
fixed costs have been invested, a negotiation between the patentee and
the producer will no longer reach the efficient outcome because the
patentee will be able to engage in holdup. For both these reasons, the
investment of substantial fixed costs marks the true theoretical
boundary between "ex ante" and "ex post" negotiation. However,
because in practice it will be difficult to pinpoint when "substantial"
fixed costs have been invested, in the remainder of this Article I will
generally define an ex ante search as one occurring before the
commencement of infringement-that is, the first manufacture or sale.

91. A further point to consider, outlined infra Part III.C.2, is that the current misallocation
of search duty creates a perverse result where patentees do have an incentive to hide, even at the
ex ante point in time.
92. In a recent article, Richard Epstein, Scott Kieff, and Daniel Spulber argue that this
definition of "ex ante" is wrong, and that the proper point in time for measurement is before
anyone (either patentee or producer) has made fixed investments. Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott
Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private
Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2012). They then argue that this favors the
status quo that provides strong rights to patentees. Id. Epstein, Kieff and Spulber may be correct
that the proper time for measurement should be before either the producer or the patentee has
made fixed investments, but that definition does not support their conclusion: if we assess the
relative search costs before a patentee has made any fixed investments-i.e., before an inventor
has conceived of an invention and when he is merely one person among the undifferentiated
mass of seven billion people-then it decisively points toward always allocating the search duty
on the patentee.
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B. ComparingSearch Rules
Because search is reciprocal, it follows that the law can impose
the duty of search on either producers or patentees. From a socialefficiency perspective, we should choose the legal rule that will result
in lower social cost. In comparing the social costs of the two
alternative legal rules, however, it should first be noted that they have
somewhat different structures.
On the producer side, the current legal rule requiring
producers to search, backed by the penalty of injunction threats and
associated holdup costs if they fail, 9 3 creates a binary choice structure
for producers. That is, a rational producer operating under this search
duty can choose either to conduct an exhaustive search that finds
every patentee, or to conduct no search at all. A rational producer is
very unlikely to choose to conduct a partial search that finds some
patentees.
This is because finding only some patents does a producer very
little good. Contrary to the common belief that more missed patents
means more holdup, 94 producers face essentially the same holdup
threat if they miss even a single patent as they do if they miss
thousands.95 Having a thousand people threatening to shut down the
factory is not very different from having just one, since the producer is
only willing to pay one ransom no matter how many threats there are.
Unless the producer can find all the patentees ahead of time at a
reasonable cost, his rational strategy is to spend nothing on search
and simply pay the holdup ransom, letting the patentees fight among
themselves over how to divide it.96
The picture is different for patentee searches. If patentees are
faced with a duty to find producers, backed up by the threat of losing
93. It should be noted in this context that holdup, despite its pejorative name, is not always
bad. In cases where the producer is the lower-cost searcher, the threat of holdup provides an
incentive for producers to search ahead of time. See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent
Infringement: A TransactionalModel, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (2008).
94. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 2011 (arguing that "the magnitude of the
problem is multiplied by the number of patents that read on the product").
95.
See Vincenzo Denicol6 et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in HighTech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 595
(2008) (presenting a mathematical model illustrating how more patent holders means that each
patentee receives a smaller share of the holdup rent).
96. This is a simplification, in that I am assuming that every patentee will become a
holdup threat and that the threats will all come at the same time. If these assumptions are not
true (and they are not strictly true in real life), then there is some payoff to a partial search. But
my point is that the payoff is much smaller than commonly assumed, because the intuitive belief
that finding more patents directly and proportionately reduces the holdup threat is wrong.
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infringement remedies against any producers whom they do not
approach ahead of time, the patentees will not need to find every
producer in order to maintain good incomes. For example, if I hold a
patent on microprocessors, and the law imposed a new duty on me to
search for producers, there are two entities that I would immediately
find and approach: Intel and AMD. These two well-known producers
together hold over 90% of the market in microprocessors.9 7 A patentee
who found these two entities and did not search for any others would
thus preserve at least 90% of his remedy. Unlike with producers,
patentee search is not an on-off proposition.
Stated another way, a rational patentee would not find every
producer even under a patentee-search rule, and it is socially efficient
that he does not. 98 A numerical example will demonstrate this point.
Suppose there are ten producers who would be interested in using the
invention. The first is a very large producer, who would be willing to
pay $100 for a license (in an ex ante negotiation) because he will use
the invention extensively. The second is a slightly smaller producer,
who is willing to pay $90, and so on. Suppose also that the marginal
cost of search increased. That is, it is very easy to find the first
producer because it is a large well-known company ($10), but it
becomes progressively more difficult and thus expensive to find
smaller and lesser-known producers, so finding the second producer
costs $20, and so on. If we required patentees to search on pain of
forfeiting any recovery from producers who are not found, then a
rational patentee would spend a total of $150 ($10 + $20 + $30 + $40 +
$50) to find the five largest and highest-paying producers, and ignore
the remaining five, since the sixth-highest-paying producer will pay
only $50, but it would cost $60 to find that sixth producer.99
Of course, there is still a social loss from the patentee not
finding every producer and thus forfeiting part of his remedy. The
social loss is the loss of incentives for innovation that a greater
patentee remedy would have produced. By definition, the ex ante
incentive effect of a patent reward is less than the reward itself, since
97. Dylan McGrath, Intel Sets Sights on New Markets, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES,
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4086341/Intel-sets-sights-on-newmarkets ("Intel owns more than 80 percent of the microprocessor market. AMD holds about 10
percent, sometimes slightly more.").
98. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.5 (8th ed. 2011) (noting that
even a strictly liable defendant will not take non-cost-benefit justified precautions).
99. Note the public and private cost is aligned here. As a society, we would not want the
patentee to spend $60 to find a producer who is only willing to pay $50 in royalties, since the
social benefit of the increase in research incentives from the royalty (which cannot be more than
$50) is outweighed by the social expenditure of $60 in search costs.
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a patentee making investments in research must discount for the risk
of failure.o00 But as a conservative first approximation I will use the
full royalty payment as a proxy for this incentive loss. The social cost
of a patentee-search rule is thus the actual search costs expended by a
rational patentee to find the relatively larger and better-known
producers (which preserves the incentive effect for those producers
that a patentee finds), plus the incentive loss arising from the forfeited
remedy against smaller and unknown producers. In our hypothetical
with ten producers, the social cost of a patentee-search rule is thus
only $300, representing the search cost of finding the largest five
producers, and the forfeited incentive from the smaller five producers.
Now compare this result with a producer-search rule. Assume
for convenience that producers face the exact same amount of search
difficulty as patentees. Thus, it costs a producer $10 to find the first
patentee, $20 to find the second patentee, $30 to find the third
patentee, etc. What is the social cost of the rule? Because a producersearch rule requires the producer to find every last patentee, the total
search cost expended will be $550. This is an application of the
economic law of increasing marginal cost that finding the last
patentee/producer will be extremely difficult and expensive. 101
Because a producer-search rule requires finding the last patentee but
a patentee-search rule does not require finding the last producer, all
else being equal, a patentee-search rule would be more efficient.
My hypothetical is rather artificial, but in a conservative way.
In real life the difference in difficulty between finding the first patent
or producer (really easy) and finding the last patent or producer
(really hard) is not going to be only ten times, but millions of times.
The difference in efficiency between the two search rules is thus likely
to be magnified by orders of magnitude.
Moreover, in calculating the social cost under a patentee-search
rule, I have assumed thus far that the lost incentive (when patentees
choose to forfeit a producer because search is too expensive) is the full
amount of the royalty that a producer would have paid. In reality, the
forfeiture of a difficult-to-find producer is likely to have only a very
100. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523, 546 (2010)
(explaining how the incentive effect must be adjusted for uncertainty); see also Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1591-94 (2009)
(arguing that copyright law should not protect against uses that are unforeseen at the time of
creation). It should be noted that each dollar of investment that is induced by patent incentives
can produce more than that amount in social welfare, so I am not saying that the social benefit of
a patent is always less than the monopoly reward.
101. See SAMPAT MUKHERJEE, MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 88 (4th ed. 2002) (illustrating
the law of increasing marginal cost).
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minor effect on incentives. This is because a difficult-to-find producer
is also likely to be an unforeseen producer at the time of initial
research. Stated differently, producers who were known at the time of
initial research are (1) easy to find afterward, and (2) more important
to the patentee's incentives. Conversely, a producer who is very hard
to find is also likely to be unforeseen at the time of initial research
and, therefore, less important to the patentee's incentives. 102 To
illustrate with an example, if I am researching microprocessors, then I
will attach tremendous importance to being able to have a remedy
against Intel and AMD, both because those two companies are the
entities most likely to make extensive use of my invention, and
because I know this ahead of time when I am conducting my research.
Conversely, I will attach less importance to other potential producers
of microprocessors, both because they are unlikely to use my invention
as extensively, and also because it is cognitively more difficult to
attach much importance to an entity I do not even know about and
cannot concretely imagine. 103 This is not to say that I will attach no
importance to having a remedy against future startups that might
start building microprocessors, but they are less important than Intel
and AMD. Limiting my future rights against such unknown producers
is much less likely to diminish my incentives than placing the same
limits on my rights against Intel and AMD.
In sum, although there is very little empirical data on the costs
of patentee searching, three points suggest that imposing the duty of
search on patentees is more efficient in many cases, and probably the
majority of cases. First, there is an extensive literature on the high
costs of producer search. 104 While it is theoretically possible for
patentee searching to be even more expensive, at least as a first guess
this is unlikely. Second, the social costs of the two search rules are
structured differently. There is no need for patentees to find every
producer to preserve incentives, whereas producers must find every
last patentee to avoid holdup; this difference is significant once we
consider the law of increasing marginal cost. Third, the social loss
from a rule requiring patentees to search is inherently mitigated by
the fact that hard-to-find producers are also likely to contribute less to
a patentee's original research incentives, 105 but no such inherent
mitigation mechanism applies to the holdup problem that arises under

102.
103.
104.
105.

Chiang, supra note 100, at 546.
Balganesh, supra note 100, at 1603.
See supra Parts I.A.2 & 3.
Chiang, supra note 100, at 546.
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a rule requiring producers to search. The cumulative effect of these
three points is that a producer-search rule is likely to be efficient in
the majority of cases, or at least in a nonnegligible portion.
C. Consequences of MisallocatingSearch Duty
The previous Section provided a rather abstract account of how
patentees are likely to be the lower-cost searchers. This Section
describes some real-life symptoms that manifest when the search duty
is misallocated onto the higher-cost searcher. The fact that patent law
currently displays these symptoms again illustrates that the search
duty is probably misallocated in at least some cases.
To once again take the analogy of tort law, two things happen
when we allocate the duty to take precautions to the higher-cost
avoider. The first is that, when the cost of compliance becomes too
high, people simply breach their duty rather than comply. Second,
when the wrong party is given the duty, it creates the so-called "moral
hazard" problem on the part of putative victims. Both phenomena
have been observed in patent law, as I shall explain below.
1. Breach of Duty as a Cost of Doing Business
A common situation where the duty of taking precautions is
placed on the higher-cost avoider is strict liability. For example, the
law could hold product manufacturers absolutely liable for any harm
caused by their products,106 with no contributory negligence defense,o 7
and this effectively translates into a legal duty on manufacturers to
make their products absolutely safe. But, of course, the manufacturer
is not always the least cost avoider of harm arising from its products;
for example, the consumer would be the lower-cost avoider of harm if
he recklessly drives a car and crashes into a tree. At its extreme, an
absolute liability regime would still allocate the duty to make the
product safe to the manufacturer; that is, the manufacturer would
have to make the car safe even for reckless drivers, or be liable for any
resulting injuries. In reality, while some early product liability cases

106. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (proposing strict product liability).
107. See, e.g., Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. 1974) (rejecting
contributory negligence defense for product liability).
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suggested such an extreme duty, 08 courts quickly backed off once they
realized the pernicious consequences.109
The reason for this retreat is that although the law could
theoretically impose such an absolute duty, the result is not that car
manufacturers would make their product safe for even a reckless
driver. Instead, what would happen is that car manufacturers would
ignore this legal duty. Since compliance is more costly than the
expectation-adjusted damages award, manufacturers will simply
breach the duty and treat the consequent legal penalties as a cost of
doing business.11o In such situations, absolute liability does not induce
more precaution taking, and therefore does not reduce social cost.
The same phenomenon occurs in patent law. The current law
imposes an absolute duty on producers to find every patentee before
commencing manufacture of a product, on pain of fairly draconian
sanctions (holdup through an injunction)."' But just because the law
can impose an impossibly onerous duty does not mean that producers
can or will magically comply with it. Rather, economic theory predicts
that they will simply breach the duty and treat the consequent legal
penalties as a cost of doing business. As Mark Lemley has described,
this is precisely what happens:
[C]ompanies in component industries simply ignore patents. Virtually everyone does it.
They do it at all stages of endeavor. Companies and lawyers tell engineers not to read
patents in starting their research. ... Nor do they conduct a search before launching
their own product. Rather, they wait and see if any patent owner claims that the new
product infringes their patent. 112

The fact that producers prefer to pay the penalty rather than
comply with the law by searching often elicits strong condemnation. 13
The same is true of manufacturers who prefer to pay the penalty
108. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Cal. 1972) (rejecting contributory
negligence defense for product liability); Henderson, 519 S.W.2d at 89-90.
109. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1175 (Cal. 1978) (overruling Luque
and adopting comparative fault); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984)
(overruling Henderson and adopting comparative fault).
110. See POSNER, supra note 98, at 178 (noting that "the expected cost of liability ... is less
than the cost of avoidance, and so avoidance doesn't pay").
111. See Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 575, 582 (1852) ("Patents are public records. All
persons are bound to take notice of their contents."); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that patent infringement is a strict liability offense).
112. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22.
113. See, e.g., Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 306 n.144 (2007) ("Witnesses for high-tech companies freely admit
that they do not perform any patent clearance studies before releasing their products. The
current 'head in the sand' approach that is the current standard operating procedure should not
be viewed as acceptable to anyone." (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
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rather than make their products absolutely safe, most famously when
Ford decided to pay legal damages rather than redesign the Pinto
after concluding that the cost of redesign would exceed the expected
legal liability. 114 This is a classic divide between normal people and
law-and-economics scholars. Normal people think that Ford's conduct
(and a producer's decision to ignore patents) is the very definition of
evil. 115 Economists think that it is a rational response to legal
incentives." 6 But regardless of whether one thinks that deliberately
breaching an impossibly onerous legal duty is evil, rational, or both
evil and rational, my point is that a legal duty that demands the
impossibly onerous from its target is probably a misallocated duty.
And the evidence suggests that this is precisely what has happened in
patent law, given that producers have demonstrated that they will pay
draconian sanctions rather than comply with the absolute duty to
search.
2. Moral Hazard and Patent Trolls
The second problem with misallocating the duty from ,the
lower-cost party to the higher-cost party is that it induces so-called
"moral hazard" on the part of the putative victim. For example,
suppose that the law always held bicycle riders liable for collisions
with pedestrians, 117 no matter how little care the pedestrian was
taking, and the law always assessed a fully compensatory remedy that
made the pedestrian whole. The obvious problem is that pedestrians
would have no incentive to take any care for themselves against
potential collisions, 18 so they would not watch out for bicycles when
hiking on a bike trail (let us assume that the remedy is truly fully
compensatory, so that the pedestrian is made indifferent to injury).

114. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ("Ford . . .
decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing
human lives and limbs against corporate profits.").
115. See id.; Gregory, supra note 113, at 306 n.144.
116. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the FordPinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1036-38
(1991) (noting that standard law and economics, starting from the Carroll-Towing formula down,
would call for precisely such cost-benefit balancing); see also Lemley, supra note 113, at 25-29
(arguing that producers should ignore patents due to high search costs).
117. I choose a bicycle accident instead of car accident here for the obvious reason that a car
accident may kill the pedestrian and thereby preclude meaningful recovery of compensation by
the victim.
118. POSNER, supra note 98, at 172 (noting that in the absence of contributory negligence
"the plaintiff would have no incentive to take preventative measures because he will be fully
compensated for his injury, and the efficient solution will not be obtained").
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The result is more accidents than under a regime where pedestrians
had an incentive to take care.
Now imagine something further, which is that instead of being
only fully compensated, injured pedestrians are given a
supercompensatory award, so they are in fact made better off if they
are involved in a collision. This moral hazard problem is obviously
increased, in that pedestrians now have an incentive to affirmatively
try to get run over. In such a world, pedestrians would hide in bushes
and jump in front of oncoming bicycles at the last minute.
Even imagining such a world seems absurd. But this is
precisely what happens in the patent world. The result of placing
absolute liability on producers to search and also giving a
supercompensatory remedy (the holdup effect gives a patentee like
NTP more than what it could have received in an ex ante negotiation)
is that patentees affirmatively try to get their patents infringed. Akin
to hiding in bushes and jumping in front of bicycles, patentees like
Rambus try to hide their patents from the relevant industry, only
springing up after the industry has sunk irreversible investments into
an infringing project. 119 The phenomenon is so common, and the
profits so large, that it has occurred throughout the history of patent
law under various names. In the nineteenth century, this was known
as the "patent shark" phenomenon, 120 where patentees ambushed
farmers who had made irreversible investments in their inadvertently
infringing farm equipment. 121 In the twentieth century, this was
known as the "submarine patent" phenomenon, where patentees
would hide ("submerge") their patents in the patent office until an
industry had made irreversible investments, and then the patentee
would "surface" to hold the industry to ransom. 122 Today, the problem
is known as the "patent troll" phenomenon, after the mythical troll
that hides under a bridge before emerging to demand a ransom.123 In
all these cases the patentee's strategy is the same. And in all these
cases, the underlying theme is that patentees benefit from, and thus
affirmatively seek, to have their patents infringed and obtain an ex
119. See supra text accompanying notes 45-56.
120. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007).
121. Id. at 1822-24.
122. Donald S. Chisum, Introduction, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 445 (1993) (describing
submarine patents as those that "hide unseen beneath the PTO 'patent pending' ocean and, after
an industry sets sail unaware of proprietary rights claims, surface with torpedoes ready to fire").
123. Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 336, 340 (2005) ("[A] troll hides under bridges, metaphorically speaking, waiting for
companies to produce and market products.").
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post holdup remedy, rather than to avoid such infringement through
ex ante negotiations.
Numerous scholars have discussed the patent troll
phenomenon. 124 But the usual explanation focuses on how hard it is
for producers to find patents and thus considers only how to make
producer search easier. 125 The contribution of this Article is to show
that producers' inability to search is only half the story. Looking at the
problem through the law-and-economics lens of moral hazard tells us
that the more fundamental problem lies on the other side of the
equation: patentees have inefficiently low incentives to search because
they do not bear the cost of inadvertent infringement and actually
benefit from the opportunity to engage in holdup. Making holdup pay
privately, even as it is inefficient socially, means more holdup occurs
than is optimal.
Two lessons emerge. The first is that the provision of a
supercompensatory remedy on top of a misallocated search duty
creates a super moral hazard problem. Not only do patentees refrain
from search, they affirmatively hide and then ambush inadvertent
infringers. But the second lesson is that the problem is not merely
that patentees hide. We not only want pedestrians to refrain from
hiding in bushes and ambushing cyclists, but we also want them to
affirmatively take care against potential collisions. In a similar vein, a
truly optimal solution to the patent search problem involves not just
making patentees stop hiding, which others have advocated, 126 but
also involves making them affirmatively search.
D. Imposing a Duty of Search on Patentees
My proposal is to impose a duty of search on patentees when
they are the lower-cost searchers (and to retain the existing allocation
of search duty on producers in all other cases). The duty includes not
only finding the producer, but also contacting the producer to initiate

124. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Are UniversitiesPatent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615-19 (2008); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and
Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512-25 (2003) (examining
the patent troll phenomenon).
125. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 120, at 1815 (stating that the troll problem occurs
because "the existence of a patent is easy to overlook" and "patent law holds a defendant liable
for infringement even if it does not know that an item is patented").
126. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 86, at 225.
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negotiations over the patent.127 At the same time, it is important to
emphasize that a patentee would only need to initiate the
negotiation-there is no requirement that the negotiation succeed. The
essence of a property rule, after all, is that the property owner has the
option of refusal; 128 otherwise, we fall into a compulsory transfer
regime. My point in this Article is that we can preserve a property
rule for patents yet at the same time overcome the problem of high
producer search costs by reallocating the duty of search to patentees.
An objection that may arise at this point is that no patentee
can determine ahead of time whether he is the lower-cost searcher; so
how would he know whether to conduct the search? The answer to this
objection lies, once again, in the analogy to tort law. Nobody knows
ahead of time whether a particular tort defendant or a particular tort
plaintiff is the lower-cost avoider of an accident. However, by imposing
liability on the least cost avoider as determined ex post, both parties
will respond ex ante by taking efficient precautions against liability.129
In patent law, the efficient precaution for a party is to perform a costjustified search.
To see how this works, consider first the common tort situation
where a manufacturer sells a product to a consumer, and each side
can decide whether to take certain precautions. For example, the
product in question might be a heater, and the manufacturer can add
a safety switch for $5, which has a 10% chance of preventing a fire
that would cause $100 of loss. Additionally, the manufacturer can take
the more drastic measure of redesigning the heater completely for $50,
which will have a 20% chance of preventing the $100 fire. Of course,
the consumer can also take some preventative measures, and so
suppose that keeping the heater away from flammable objects is worth
$1 in inconvenience but reduces the chance of the $100 fire by 5%, and
that the consumer can also undertake a radical safety measure such
as installing an automatic sprinkler system in his home for $90, which
has a 40% chance of preventing any fires. As should be obvious, from a
social perspective we want both the manufacturer and the consumer
to take the cheap precautions, but not the radical redesigns, because
the (social) costs of the radical measures exceed the expected benefits.

127. This second prong is necessary to prevent gaming by patentees such as Rambus, who
found the relevant producers but then hid the relevant patent.
128. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092.
129. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE
LAW 18 (1994) (demonstrating how both sides have optimal incentives under a rule of strict
liability combined with contributory negligence).
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As a theoretical matter, we can imagine four possible legal
rules that we might adopt to achieve our preferred outcome: (1) no
liability, where any loss is always placed on the consumer; (2) absolute
liability without contributory negligence, where any loss is always
placed on the manufacturer; (3) strict liability with contributory
negligence, where the loss is placed on the manufacturer by default,
but is shifted to the consumer if the consumer fails to take reasonable
precautions; and (4) negligence liability (with or without contributory
negligence) where the loss is placed on the consumer by default unless
the manufacturer fails to take reasonable precautions. As is well
established in the tort literature, the first two rules are suboptimal
because they induce moral hazard by the immunized party. If we
adopted a regime of no liability, the consumer would still take the
reasonable precaution, because his own personal gain (a 5% chance of
avoiding the $100 fire) is greater than his loss ($1 of inconvenience);
but the manufacturer would have no incentive to take any precautions
at all. Conversely, in an absolute liability regime the manufacturer
will take the proper precaution, but the consumer would not. The
result is that we end up with more loss from fires than is desirable.
What is less obvious, but is equally well established in the tort
literature, is that rules (3) and (4) have largely the same effects on
behavior, and both induce efficient behavior. 30 In a regime of strict
liability with contributory negligence, the consumer will have the
incentive to keep the heater away from flammable materials (because
otherwise he will be found to be contributorily negligent). At the same
time, because the manufacturer at the time of making a product
cannot casually assume that consumers will be contributorily
negligent in later using it-in most cases they will not be-it should
assume that it will be held strictly liable. Under this assumption, the
manufacturer will take the cost-justified precaution of installing the
$5 safety switch, since the private benefit (avoiding a 10% chance of
$100 in liability) outweighs the $5 cost. Importantly, the
manufacturer will not undertake the radical redesign even under a
regime of strict liability, because it is cheaper simply to pay the $20 in
expected loss than to undertake the $50 precaution. 13' The mirror
analysis occurs under a negligence regime, which is equivalent to
holding the consumer strictly liable for a loss unless the manufacturer
130. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 85, at 80 ("[S]trict liability with a defense of
contributory negligence yields the same levels of due care for potential injurers and potential
victims as negligence with or without a defense of contributory negligence.").
131. See id. at 64 ("[Sltrict liability will not cause a potential injurer to take more than due
care.").

34

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1:1

is negligent. The manufacturer will have the incentive to take costjustified precautions to avoid liability for negligence; while the
consumer-because he cannot casually assume that the manufacturer
has been negligent (if the consumer knows the manufacturer has been
negligent, then he will be held to have voluntarily assumed the risk)will also have the incentive to take reasonable (but not excessive)
safety precautions to prevent harm to himself.132
Three important points are worth emphasizing. The first point
is that rules (3) and (4) both effectively allocate the loss to the lowercost avoider. Even though strict liability purports to allocate the loss
to the manufacturer regardless of cost advantage, the availability of
contributory negligence as a defense means that the consumer will be
allocated the loss if the consumer is the lower-cost avoider (if we
define "contributory negligence" as failure to take cost-justified
precautions, which the law-and-economics literature usually does). 133
The second point is that this beneficial effect occurs even though
nobody knows ahead of time who the lower-cost avoider iS.134 The third
point follows from the second: the real-world effects of a legal duty can
differ very significantly from the semantic wording of the duty on
paper. A supposedly "absolute" duty on manufacturers to design safe
products is not really intended to ensure absolutely safe products, and
it cannot possibly achieve that outcome. Rather, strict product liability
can only induce reasonable precautions by manufacturers. 135 In a
similar vein, the point of imposing a duty on patentees to search ex
ante if they are the least cost searchers is not to create a regime where
patentees ask themselves: "Am I the lower-cost searcher vis-A-vis a
producer who I haven't found yet (and thus cannot possibly compare
myself against)?" Expecting patentees to make such a comparison
would be absurd. The point of imposing the legal duty is to create the
real-world effect of inducing patentees to perform reasonable searches
based on the fear that they might be found liable and lose their
remedy if they failed to search.
The translation of the tort paradigm to patent searches is
straightforward. Assume that we have a patentee holding a patent on
132. Cf. Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(noting that, in general, assessments of reasonableness assume that the other side takes due
care).
133. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 85, at 74 (defining contributory negligence in these
terms).
134. See BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 129, at 14-16 (using game theory, with the
assumption of ignorance of the other side's actions, to demonstrate the efficiency of tort rules).
135. See supratext accompanying notes 131-32.
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a new type of computer, and a manufacturer of computers is thinking
of introducing a new model that would infringe the patent but has not
yet sunk fixed costs or commenced infringement. In the absence of the
parties finding each other before infringement occurs, the resulting
inadvertent infringement would cause $100 of social loss. Importantly,
from an economic perspective the loss still occurs even if the patentee
eventually sues the manufacturer and the parties either negotiate a
license after the fact or have the court impose a remedy-by that point
the inadvertent infringement would already have occurred, social
resources would already have been wasted by developing the same
invention twice, and the patent system would thus already have
failed. The way to prevent the social loss is rather to ensure that an ex
ante negotiation occurs. How can this be effectuated?
As with the tort example, the way to achieve the optimal result
is to have both patentees and producers take reasonable ex ante
precautions, namely by engaging in cost-justified searches. Now
assume that the producer can conduct either an inexpensive patent
search costing $5 (e.g., having a low-level associate look up the PTO
database), or a very expensive search costing $50. Similarly, the
patentee can conduct either an inexpensive $1 search for producers
(e.g., looking up the largest computer manufacturers on Google), or a
very expensive $90 search. Importantly, the law of diminishing
marginal returns means that a search that is ten times more
expensive will not be ten times more effective: while it is very easy to
find the first few patents/producers, it becomes rapidly more difficult
to find the remaining patents/producers. Thus, while a cursory $5
search can find 10% of all relevant patents (and thus has a 10%
chance of finding a particular patent), a $50 search will only find 20%
of all relevant patents. And while a cursory $1 search on Google can
easily find the largest 5% of computer manufacturers (and thus has a
5% chance of finding a particular producer), a $90 search will only be
able to find 40% of all relevant manufacturers, because it is almost
impossible to chase down the last person building a computer in their
basement.
Under the current regime of absolute liability for producers,
the manufacturer will have some incentive to search for the
patentee, 136 but the patentee will have no incentive to search. This

136. Though, as noted supra in Part III.B, the manufacturer's incentive to search under an
absolute liability rule is actually less than what I have presented in this example, because his
marginal benefit to searching is very low, given that he must find every last patentee to avoid
holdup. Thus, the patentee's comparative search advantage is even stronger than what I have
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means that the patentee will not even perform a $1 search that has a
5% chance of success. This outcome is inefficient, because it means
that inadvertent infringement will occur 5% more frequently
throughout the patent system. Moreover, this 5% figure dramatically
understates the patentee's search advantage: the largest five
computer manufacturers in fact control over 60% of the market and
thus presumably cause 60% of all infringements of computer
patents,'37 and they can all be found almost instantaneously with a
simple Google search. Thus, a more realistic estimate of the efficiency
loss from not having any incentives for patentee search is that 60% of
cases of inadvertent infringement could have been cheaply prevented
if we switched the legal rule and provided an incentive for patentee
search.
Consider now my proposed legal rule that requires patentees to
search when they are the lower-cost searchers. By the same calculus
as the tort example, the result of imposing a duty on patentees to
search when they are the lower-cost searchers-and leaving the loss
with the producer in all other cases-is that both patentees and
producers will perform cost-justified searches. The patentee will
perform the $1 search, while the producer will perform the $5 search.
Importantly, neither patentees nor producers will perform the highly
expensive search, because the expected benefit will not justify the cost.
By imposing a duty to search on patentees in addition to the current
strict liability rule for producers, the efficient social outcome can be
achieved.
Thus, like the contributory negligence defense in tort law, a
"contributory search" defense should be adopted in patent law. What a
contributory search defense entails is a duty-breach-causation
analysis similar to tort law. Under my proposal, the law would impose
a duty on patentees to search when they are the lower-cost avoiders. A
producer would then bear the burden of proving that a particular
patentee breached this duty by showing that the patentee failed to
perform a cost-justified search, and that the failure caused the
resulting inadvertent infringement in the sense that a search would
have successfully found the producer. 3 8 And, like the contributory
outlined here, and this makes the reflexive allocation of search responsibility to manufacturers
even less sensible than in the present example.
137. See Gartner Says Worldwide PC Shipments Grew 3.2 Percent in Third Quarterof 2011,
GARTNER.COM (Oct. 12, 2011), http://wwwgartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1821731 (showing that the
five largest computer manufacturers controlled over sixty percent of the market at the time).
138. A reader might question the causation requirement, in the sense that if the patentee
only has a five percent chance of finding the producer, then wouldn't there be no causation? And
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negligence defense in tort law, establishment of the contributory
search defense would provide a full defense to liability-the forfeiture
of remedies providing a sanction to enforce the duty of patentee
search.139

An important note to the proposal is that a willful pirate (i.e.,
an infringer who copies the patent) will always be the lower-cost
searcher. A pirate copying the patent would necessarily know of its
existence, and once the patent has been located it is essentially
costless to locate the patentee, since the patentee's address can then
easily be found through patent office records. 140 Thus, the contributory
search analysis would only apply in cases of inadvertent infringement,
not of deliberate piracy. This is also the case in tort law: there is no
contributory negligence defense to intentional torts, because an
intentional tortfeasor is always the lower-cost avoider.1'
A reader familiar with the tort literature might ask why I favor
a contributory search defense over an affirmative negligence
requirement for liability. In tort law, strict liability with contributory
negligence produces largely the same incentives for behavior as a
regime of affirmative negligence liability, but the affirmative
negligence rule dominates in the real world. 142 If we took the tort
analogy really seriously, then one might argue that I should not be
proposing a contributory search defense superimposed on strict
producer liability, but should be proposing an affirmative negligence
regime where patentees would recover nothing unless they showed
that the producer was the lower cost searcher and failed to perform a
cost-justified search. My answer is that,. while an affirmative
negligence regime would indeed also create the correct incentives for
behavior, it requires far too radical a departure from existing doctrine.
The existing doctrine imposes absolute liability on producers, so that
if the patentee knew this ahead of time, wouldn't this eviscerate the incentive to search? But one
should consider the broader picture: a five percent chance of finding a particular producer means
that, in a world with twenty producers, a patentee would have found one. Against that one
producer, the patentee would lose his remedy, and this provides the appropriate incentive for
patentees to search ahead of time.
139. For discussion of the possible harshness of this forfeiture, and the potential for using
lesser sanctions to enforce the duty, see infra Part III.E.7.
140. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(b)(2) (2012) (requiring a patent applicant to record his address).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481 (1965) ("The plaintiffs contributory
negligence does not bar recovery against a defendant for a harm caused by conduct of the
defendant which is wrongful because it is intended to cause harm to some legally protected
interest of the plaintiff or a third person.").
142. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377,
382-85 (2002) (noting that strict liability, either with or without contributory negligence, has not
expanded for the last half century).
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producers are always allocated the loss arising from infringement. To
change the default all the way to imposing the loss on patentees
unless they could affirmatively prove producer negligence in search
would be too radical. My comparatively moderate solution, which
achieves largely the same economic result, is to superimpose a
contributory search defense on top of the existing absolute producer
liability, a proposal that requires less doctrinal adjustment.
A contributory search defense does face the problem that it
requires a case-by-case comparison of patentee search costs against
producer search costs, which is difficult and costly for courts to do
even ex post. This problem occurs in an affirmative negligence regime
as well, but does not occur in an absolute liability regime. At root it is
a reflection of the classic rules-versus-standards problem:
individualized analysis achieves great precision at a theoretical level
but in practice creates high administrative costs, while more
categorical rules have lower administrative costs but less precision.143
But even if one were to favor rules and lower administrative costs, this
alone cannot justify the existing regime, which significantly
misallocates search responsibility and seems to generate extremely
high administrative costs (in the form of frequent litigation)
notwithstanding the categorical rule. For those readers who find caseby-case determinations of search costs too administratively difficult, I
will present a more rule-based proposal in Part IV. That proposal is
less theoretically precise than the contributory search defense, but it
has the advantage of lower administrative costs, while still achieving
better outcomes than the absolute producer liability rule.
E. Addressing Objections
1. Producers Will Hide Their Infringing Activities
The most common objection to my proposal is that producers
will hide their infringing activities. As previously explained in Part
III.A, this objection fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the
search problem and my proposal to address it. Contrary to the
frequent assumption of lawyers (whose jobs center around ex post
litigation and negotiation), the social purpose of the patent system is
not to have patentees and infringers negotiate a license after an
143. See Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination:Age Discriminationand Sexual
Harassment, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1999) ("Rules have higher error costs but lower
administrative costs; standards have lower error costs but higher administrative costs. The
relative size of the two types of cost will determine the efficient choice.").
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infringing product has been developed. 144 The fact that patent
litigation revolves around such a fact pattern is an unfortunate
byproduct of the patent system, not the fundamental social problem it
is trying to solve.
The social problem that the patent system is trying to solve is
how to bring ingenious inventors with no capital and capital-rich
manufacturers with no ideas together before an infringing product has
been independently reinvented and developed.4 At this ex ante point
in time, there is no problem of the manufacturer hiding from the
inventor because there is nothing to hide and no incentive to hide. And
my proposal is to impose a duty on patentees at this point in time to
find the producer. There is no need to consider the problem of
producers hiding their infringing activities at this point in time,
because there is no infringing activity to hide.
2. Requiring Property Owners to Search Is Unprecedented
Another objection that is commonly voiced is that a duty of
patentee search seems completely contrary to standard principles of
property law.14 6 The one-sided view of search is deeply ingrained and
is usually regarded as intrinsic to a property right.147 In one sense, the
very point of this Article is to demonstrate that this objection and the
one-sided view of search that it embodies are misguided.
An additional, and slightly different, answer is that requiring
property owners to search for trespassers is actually neither
unprecedented nor unknown to property law. As Jonathan Masur
discusses, 148 patent law in fact imposes search duties on patentees
after infringement occurs: unless the patentee finds and sues an
infringer within six years from when a reasonable search would have
discovered the infringement, the defense of laches deprives the

144. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader,
J., concurring) (arguing that patent law should favor ex post negotiated licenses over judicially
imposed compulsory licenses).
145. See Arrow, supra note 18, at 615 (noting that the owner of information "may not be able
to exploit it as effectively as others").
146. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The
law of the United States is a copyright owner may sit back, do nothing and enjoy his property
rights untrammeled by others exploiting his works without permission." (internal alterations
omitted)).
147. See, e.g., MICELI, supra note 32, at 157 (reflexively assuming that a property right
against injury means that the injurer must identify the victim ahead of time).
148. Masur, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that patent law's liability rules "allocate search
responsibilities").
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patentee of his remedy against that infringer permanently.149 In real
property law, the doctrine of adverse possession does the same thing,
and goes even further by depriving the property owner of his entire
property right.150
There are important conceptual and operational differences
between patentees performing ex post searches for infringers and ex
ante searches for cooperative producers, as I discussed in Part III.A.
At the same time, imposing a duty on patentees to perform an ex ante
search is not very radical if one regards it as a logical extension of
laches and adverse possession doctrine. Perhaps the greatest irony of
the situation is that judges and lawyers find a duty of ex ante
patentee/property-owner search to be unimaginable when a duty of ex
post patentee/property-owner search is so well established.
3. Preserving the Trade-Secrecy Option
A conceptual cousin of the previous objection is the argument
that requiring patentee notice-at least requiring notice before patent
issuance-destroys the trade-secrecy option that inventors have under
current law. That is, current law provides patentees with the option to
keep their invention secret until the patent issues,' 5 on the theory
that if the patent is denied, the inventor will be able to resort to the
trade secret system to exploit his invention. 152 Imposing a duty on
patentees to search for producers and inform them of the patent
application lies in tension with the idea that inventors have the option
to return to trade secrecy if their patent application is denied.
Although there is tension between these two ideas, this tension
is reflective of a broader tension in the patent system's attitude
towards the trade-secrecy option. While patent law does allow
inventors to keep their inventions secret before a patent issues, it also
does many things to penalize inventors who wish to maintain this
option and to encourage early public disclosure. Most directly, in cases
where two people invent the same thing close in time,153 the inventor
149. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(en banc) (creating a presumption of laches after six years).

150. See generally 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 1.
151. 35 U.S.C.

§ 154

(2006) (requiring patent applications be kept confidential).

152. Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 587, 624 (2006).
153. This phenomenon occurs with regularity. See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach
to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 68-69 (2008) (citing historical examples of
individuals who invented the same device close in time); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole
Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712-15 (2012) (noting that multiple individuals and groups
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who publicly discloses the invention has an enormous advantage in
obtaining priority to the patent over the competing inventor who
keeps the invention secret.154 In short, while patent law technically
permits inventors to retain the trade-secrecy option, it also seeks to
make maintaining secrecy as practically unattractive as possible. 55
In this sense, my proposal is consistent with the theoretical
framework underlying patent law. It does not absolutely forbid
patentees from keeping their inventions secret during the pendency of
an application-that is, it does not invalidate a resulting patent as a
penalty for such conduct. Rather, all my proposal does is create a
practical incentive against such secrecy, because a patentee who fails
to search will risk losing his infringement remedies against individual
producers. Compared to the already-existing risk of losing priority
against a competing inventor-and, therefore, losing the entire
patent-my proposal is actually quite mild.
4. Patentees Cannot Foresee All Uses of Their Inventions
An objection that is facially similar to the first objection-but is
in fact quite conceptually distinct-is that patentees cannot foresee all
possible producers and all possible uses of their inventions.15 6 I have
already dealt with the argument that patentees cannot foresee all
possible producers in Part III.A, the short version being that it is
unnecessary for patentees to find all possible producers, when finding
the largest and most well-known producers will preserve over 90% of a
patentee's original remedy and corresponding incentives to invent.157
Perhaps equally important, royalties from producers that a patentee
cannot foresee are the least likely to contribute to the original
incentive to invent, since by definition they were unforeseeable at the
time of invention.

historically have worked on the same types of projects at the same time but independently from
each other).
154. This is true even under the new patent statute. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B)) (giving
priority to the first person to file a patent application for, or to publicly disclose, the invention).
155. See Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[Tjhe spirit
and policy of the patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that 'the public has
gained knowledge of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain' or else
run the risk of being dominated by the patent of another." (quoting Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d
1377, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1973))).
156. Cf. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 243 (1832) (arguing for broad patentee
rights to amend due to concern about unforeseen uses).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
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A similar response applies to the objection that patentees
cannot foresee all future uses. As an initial matter, this objection's
factual premise is true enough, in that patentees often discover new
markets and new uses for an invention after it has been developed. A
good example of such a serendipitous new use is Play-Doh,15 8 which
Kutol Products originally formulated as a nontoxic wallpaper
cleaner.159 It was only after Kutol discovered that children were using
the substance to mold figures that it was sold as a toy.16o It would

obviously have been difficult for Kutol to have foreseen a toymaker as
a potential licensee for its wallpaper cleaner and search for producers
in the toy industry.
To this objection there are two responses. First, the
determination of the least cost searcher is a comparative one. If a
toymaker such as Mattel has the idea to use Kutol wallpaper cleaner
as a toy, it would need to find out the chemical formula for that
wallpaper cleaner by reading the patent, and in doing so would
necessarily know that the substance is patented and who the owner
is. 161 At this point-which is ex ante because it occurs before
infringement and before the substantial investment of fixed coststhere would be no conceivable argument that it is more expensive for
Mattel to find the patentee than for the patentee to find Mattel. Thus,
at least in cases where the unforeseen use occurs by derivation from
the patent, the producer would always be the least cost searcher.
Second, the very unforeseeability of the alternative use brings
into play the same inherent mitigation mechanism as described in
Part III.A. That is, to the extent that the later use is completely
unforeseeable at the time of the patentee's original conception, the
unforeseen use is also unlikely to form a significant part of the
patentee's original research incentive. 162 The serendipitous and

158. See U.S. Patent No. 3,167,440 (filed May 17, 1960) (patent for Play-Doh).
159. TIM WALSH, TIMELESS TOYS: CLASSIC TOYS AND THE PLAYMAKERS WHO CREATED THEM
115 (2005).
160. Id. at 116-17.
161. Of course, there are methods of derivation that do not require reading the patent
directly. For example, Mattel might purchase some Kutol wallpaper cleaner and have its
chemists reverse engineer the formula. But, as shall be seen in Part IV infra, that is why 35
U.S.C. § 287 is so important. If Kutol marks its wallpaper cleaner with the patent number, then
Mattel will know that the formula is patented. Cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131
S. Ct. 2060, 2071 (2011) (finding it to be willful blindness to reverse engineer a product without
considering that it might be patented).
162. Balganesh, supranote 100, at 1603.
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unexpected discovery of a new use is, in this sense, a windfall.
Removing the windfall would cause relatively little social loss. 16 3
5. Patentees Will Spam Producers
An objection on the other side is that patentees would game
any requirement that they initiate contact with producers by
spamming every conceivable producer with an email attaching their
patent.164 If this sufficed to meet a duty of search and preserved the
patentee's infringement remedies, then every patentee will
immediately follow this strategy, and the result would be that
producers receive two million issued patents (and every future issued
patent) in their inboxes. The producers would then have to sift
through all these patents or risk being held up afterwards, landing us
right back at square one.
Essentially, the problem is how to define the "search" that
satisfies a patentee duty to search. How complete must a search be? If
a search is completed by any contact with a producer-no matter how
minimal or how indiscriminately such contact is made-then spam
would count. But even a slightly more demanding requirement would
solve the spam problem.
Somewhat ironically, the well-known way to deal with a span
problem is to slightly-but only slightly-increase the cost on the
spammer, usually through an intermediary who can levy the
charge. 165 The point here is that a patentee who indiscriminately
emails the patent to every potential recipient on the planet is not truly
doing a "search" in any meaningful sense, but is instead de facto
shifting the burden to the recipient to sift through massive amounts of
email.166 But even a fairly small cost placed on the sender will require
prioritization and dramatically reduce the number of recipients.

163. And of course it is the social, not private, losses that matter for our inquiry.
164. Cf. Kevin J. Kelly, Placing the Burden Back Where It Belongs: A Proposal to Eliminate
the Affirmative Duty From Willful Infringement Analyses, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
509, 526-27 (2005) (noting that patentees adopted a similar strategy in order to obtain enhanced
damages from infringers).
165. Cf. Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 110-13
(2003) (proposing an "authorized intermediary" regime where an intermediary would charge
senders and pay recipients to reform the telemarketing industry).
166. See id. at 83 (noting the basic problem of spam is that it externalizes costs to the
recipient).
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Proposals to reduce unwanted email often suggest a penny would be
enough to prevent most spam.167
A fairly simple way to prevent patentees from spamming
producers is to define a reasonable patentee search as requiring
contact (which then leads to licensing negotiations) to be initiated
through an attorney, and not by the patentee pro se. This makes the
attorney an intermediary who can increase the transaction cost and
thereby indirectly filter out spam through patentee self-selection. 16 8
More directly, a manifestly frivolous initiation of contact-one
involving a patent that has no relationship whatsoever with the
producer's usual business--could then be punished with disciplinary
sanctions on the attorney, providing a direct measure of quality
control.169 Of course, the standard for imposing sanctions should be
very high: the point of a patentee-search regime is for patentees to
approach potential licensees before they sink irreversible investments
in designing a product, so a concrete allegation of infringement
against a specific product should not be required. The goal is only to
require that patentees give a reasonable amount of individualized
consideration to each producer in the process of fulfilling their duty to
search, rather than indiscriminately make contact with all possible
producers in the manner of a spammer. The combination of attorney
fees and potential sanctions should be more than enough to prevent
the spam problem from occurring.
It should be noted that the optimal balance between the
competing imperatives of making transaction costs high enough to
deter spamming, but not too high so as to deter legitimate patentee
contact with producers, is an empirical question. It may emerge that
requiring a lawyer to make the contact is too onerous for patentees
because attorney fees are too high, and some cheaper mechanism, for
example requiring patentees to initiate contact through another
167. See Jeffrey D.

Sullivan & Michael B. de Leeuw, Spam After Can-Spam: How

Inconsistent Thinking Has Made a Hash out of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Policy, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 887, 924 & n.140 (2004). Given the prevalence of junk mail
in the actual mail system, however, something more than the cost of a first-class postage stamp
is likely required to reduce the volume of irrelevant mail to a manageable level. This is
particularly the case given that many patentees adopted a spamming strategy back when a
single letter was enough to open an infringer to enhanced damages. See Kelly, supra note 164, at
526-27 (discussing the low cost at which a patent owner could send a letter in the mail); see also
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (raising the legal
standard for obtaining enhanced damages).
168. Cf. Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
687 (2010) (arguing that the PTO serves as a "costly screen" to filter out worthless patents).
169. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that factual allegations in complaints have
evidentiary support, or potentially have evidentiary support after further discovery).
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intermediary such as the patent office (which could charge a smaller
fee), would work just as well. 70 The main point is that the concern
with patentees gaming the search rule through spam can be addressed
by fairly simple mechanisms.
One potential counterargument is that, even properly
winnowed, producers will need to license so many patents for a single
product that it is impossibly expensive to negotiate. For example, if
designing a new smartphone would require licensing six thousand
patents, then even if all these patents-and only these patents-were
sent to RIM ahead of time and flagged so that the search cost were
zero, it would still be extremely expensive to conduct negotiations with
six thousand patent holders.
This objection is true enough, but is directed to a somewhat
different problem than is addressed by this Article. The entire search
literature (including this Article) is premised on the assumption that
reducing search costs will help alleviate at least some of patent law's
problems, even if negotiation costs will still arise after the parties are
found. If, contrary to this assumption, the problem lies not in finding
the relevant patent holders, but in negotiating with a great many
patent holders, then the entire body of existing search literature
becomes irrelevant. Proposals to publish patent applications and to
build better patent databases will do no good if the problem lies not in
finding the patent holders, but in having six thousand legitimate
transactions to process after the patent holders are found. Nor do
proposals to convert to a liability rule and grant compulsory licenses
solve this problem: if there are six thousand legitimate patent holders
who have a claim over the resulting product, then the "optimal
solution" under a liability rule is for six thousand infringement suits
and six thousand judicial determinations of the amount of compulsorylicense royalties ex post, which is certainly not cheaper than six
thousand ex ante negotiations. In short, if the problem is that
negotiating with six thousand legitimate patent holders is too
expensive, then the only solution is to raise the standards of
patentability and grant fewer patents, which is a distinct problem
beyond the scope of this Article.

170. Obviously this works in the reverse as well, in that if lawyer fees prove too low to deter
spam, then perhaps this administrative mechanism is needed to charge higher fees.
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6. Producers Will Seek Declaratory Judgment
Besides the profits from holdup, another reason that patentees
often hesitate to contact producers is to maintain their first-strike
advantage. That is, patentees can choose when and where to file the
lawsuit,171 and this forum-shopping ability is highly valuable in a
world where judges and juries in different locales have well-known
predispositions in favor of certain parties. The Eastern District of
Texas, for example, is notoriously favorable to patentees, and
patentees therefore try very hard to place their cases in this district. 72
Patentees can only forum shop, however, if they are the only
ones that can file suit. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a
producer to file suit against the patentee, seeking a declaration that
the producer's planned activities do not infringe the patent or that the
patent is invalid. 173 If the producer can file suit first, then the
patentee would lose his first-strike advantage.1 74
Two important limits exist on producers seeking declaratory
judgment and making the first strike. First, it is obviously impossible
for a producer to file a declaratory judgment suit if the producer is
unaware of the patent's existence. Second, under prevailing Federal
Circuit doctrine, even if the producer discovers the patent through his
own independent search, in the absence of a patentee-initiatedcontact,
there is no standing to maintain the declaratory judgment suit.'7 5
Therefore, a patentee can prevent a producer from filing for
declaratory judgment simply by not initiating any communication
with the producer.176

171. Masur, supra note 4, at 187 (noting this as an important reason for patentees to look
for infringers).
172. See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9
YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 215 (2007) ("[T]he Eastern District of Texas is about the worst place in
the country to be a defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit.").

173. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201 (2006) (allowing declaratory judgments).

174. Once suit is filed, usually both the producer and the patentee seek to transfer the suit
to a locale that is in their interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (allowing transfers). Under the
so-called "first to file" rule, the forum in which the suit is first filed (including by a producer
seeking declaratory judgment) is the preferred forum in this analysis. Micron Tech., Inc. v.
Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
175. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (requiring
that the threat of future injury be "caused by" the patentee).
176. Even if the producer initiates contact with the patentee, this will not create standing
for declaratory judgment. Id. at 1341 (noting that patentee refusal to give covenant not to sue in
response to producer demand is not enough).
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The imposition of a duty on patentees to initiate contactwhich is a component of my duty to search-would therefore deprive
patentees of an important strategic advantage. But this is a benefit of
my proposal, not a downside. The point of ex ante negotiation is to
have the parties delineate their rights ahead of time, and if the parties
cannot agree on what the property right consists of, ultimately both
sides must ask a judge to adjudicate the boundary.1 7 7 This is not
converting the system to a liability rule: a producer seeking
declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed is not
asking the judge to value the invention, but to say what the invention
consists of. To take an analogy, if your neighbor argues that your
house is trespassing on his land, it is a perfectly good response to say
that it does not; and ultimately if the two of you disagree on where the
boundary of the land lies, then a judge will have to resolve the dispute.
Such adjudication of land boundaries does not convert the real
property system to a liability rule, but is instead a desirable
adjudication of property rights so that everyone knows where they
stand. Given that the general preference is to have property rights
delineated clearly ahead of time, 178 allowing earlier recourse to
declaratory judgment will help achieve this.
7. The Unfairness of Enforcing Contributory Search
A more amorphous-but not necessarily unimportantobjection to my proposal is based on fairness. There is a common
feeling that contributory negligence is a harsh doctrine because it
deprives a contributorily negligent victim of his entire remedy. This
has led the overwhelming majority of states to convert to a
comparative fault regime for tort law. 179 In a similar vein, one could
177. See Russell B. Hill & Jesse D. Mulholland, Effective Use of the DeclaratoryRemedy in
the Patent Context, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 43, 44 (2004) (noting that declaratory judgment
actions "remove the patentee's Sword of Damocles").
178. See Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1331 (2010)
(arguing that "patent infringement ... [is] especially amenable to preventive adjudication"). One
other consideration is that making declaratory judgment actions easier to initiate might mean
more litigation. But making declaratory judgment hard to initiate might mean that the
adjudication of rights is only delayed until a later date, when the stakes are higher (with accrued
damages and fixed investments on the line) and the parties correspondingly litigate harder and
spend even more in litigation costs. There is little evidence on which effect predominates. See id.
at 1301 (noting that "a highly reticulated, case-by-case cost-benefit analysis ... would not be
judicially manageable").
179. David Horton, Comment, Rethinking Assumption of Risk and Sports Spectators, 51
UCLA L. REV. 339, 350 n.67 (2003) (collecting citations for the forty-six states that have adopted
comparative fault).
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argue that the contributory search defense is equally harsh. And the
objection is quite true.
An initial point needs to be made, however, that harshness is
reciprocal. If depriving patentees of a massive payday is harsh
because the penalty is so large, then imposing this massive liability on
a producer is equally harsh. One cannot say that a large figure is
harsh for one side but justified for the other, when both sides bear
responsibility for the resulting infringement due to the reciprocity of
search. If one were to argue for a comparative fault approach where
patentees kept some portion of their remedy even in cases where the
patentee is the lower-cost searcher, one would also need to argue for
the same comparative fault regime where producers had some portion
of their liability remitted even in cases where they are the lower-cost
searchers.
Another way of saying this is that the harshness of the remedy
is proportional to its incentive effect. Imposing draconian sanctions on
producers, like a $612.5 million holdup ransom, creates strong
incentives for producers to search. In cases where producers are the
lower-cost searchers, harsh penalties like holdup actually promote
socially efficient outcomes, since producers will then be more likely to
perform the searches.180 In cases where the producers are the highercost searchers, such harsh penalties are wasteful, since they either
produce a suboptimal outcome (producers search when they are the
inefficient party) or exact a socially costly punishment for no purpose.
The exact same analysis applies to patentees: depriving patentees of a
lucrative remedy creates a strong incentive, but whether the incentive
is good or bad depends on whether the legal duty is properly allocated.
While contributory negligence may be very harsh in one sense, it is
also balanced and efficient.181
With all that said, however, it remains true that there is
intuitive discomfort with the idea of patentees forfeiting their entire
remedy due to failure to search, much as there is discomfort at the
idea of tort plaintiffs forfeiting their entire recovery due to
contributory negligence. A comparative fault regime would lessen this
discomfort by reducing the recovery in proportion to the amount of
fault that is attributable to the patentee (in failing to search) or
plaintiff (in failing to take precautions). 182 Somewhat surprisingly,

180. Heald, supra note 93, at 1191 (noting that holdup "has the benefit of increasing
incentives to search where searching is the efficient strategy").
181. POSNER, supra note 98, at 172-74 (explaining the efficiency of contributory negligence).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

§7

(2000).
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there is no great difference in the economic effects of contributory and
comparative negligence: 83 comparative negligence reduces the penalty
and thus reduces the incentive, but when the plaintiff is less at fault
there is presumably less need for a strong incentive to induce the
correct behavior. The main economic difference is that comparative
negligence has higher administrative costs, since it requires judges or
juries to allocate fault on a case-by-case basis.184 In this sense the
choice between contributory and comparative negligence is yet
another iteration of the efficiency-fairness tradeoff that is ubiquitous
across law. 85
I do not mean to disparage fairness considerations, and there is
no fundamental reason that one could not implement my proposal
through a comparative fault regime instead of a contributory search
defense, if one were prepared to accept the higher administrative
costs. 186 The only point I would emphasize is that a comparative fault
regime must still acknowledge that every inadvertent infringement is
"caused" by both sides' failures to search. Without this
acknowledgement, which will surely be highly counterintuitive to
judges and juries, a comparative fault regime will surreptitiously
revert back to an absolute duty on producers to search, since
producers will be disproportionately allocated 100% of the fault. In all
other respects the conversion of a contributory search defense to a
comparative fault allocation is so simple as to require little
elaboration.
A more complicated fairness concern relates to the distributive
impact of my proposal among producers. Stated simply, the objection
is that a contributory search defense will disproportionately benefit
the larger producers while doing little to benefit smaller producers.
This arises because, for any particular patentee, it is usually easier to
find large producers than small producers. Thus, a patentee may be
the lower-cost searcher vis-A-vis some larger producers, but the
higher-cost searcher vis-A-vis the smaller producers. The result is that
183. POSNER, supra note 98, at 174 ("Surprisingly, comparative negligence has-at least as
a first approximating [sic], and setting administrative costs to one side-the same effects on
safety as contributory negligence.").
184. Id. at 174-75.

185. Cf. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way":
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 847-48 (discussing the
tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in civil procedure).
186. One obvious objection, of course, is that comparative fault requires judges to divide
value in a way that is reminiscent of the problem of liability rules. See supra text accompanying
note 33. This is especially the case for patent law because a comparative fault regime would
require the court to divide up the value of an injunction.
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the smaller producers will be strictly liable (the default rule), while
larger producers will potentially gain the benefit of the new
contributory search defense. This creates a distributive-fairness
concern.
The objection is true enough, though there are several
responses. The first is that the contributory search defense, even for
large producers, will arise only in cases where patentees fail to
conduct cost-justified searches, which will presumably be rare. The
second is that small producers are not made any worse off than under
current law-under current law, they are absolutely liable anywayand in this sense my proposal is Pareto efficient. 87 The third and final
response is that, if we really wished to remove this concern, it is
possible to do so, but only by more radical changes in doctrine. For
example, if we shifted to an affirmative negligence regime where
patentees received no remedy unless the producer is the lower-cost
searcher, then the fairness problem would be resolved. But although
this mirror regime would be equally efficient and would remove the
fairness concern, it would require a very radical departure from
existing doctrine and would disadvantage patentees very strongly,
since patentees would presumptively get no remedy unless they
proved the producer was negligent. Such radical change seems
unjustified given the weight of the concern.
IV. REVERSING SEARCH: § 287'S NOTICE REQUIREMENT

Although a contributory search defense, with a case-by-case
comparison of patentee and producer search costs, provides the most
theoretically perfect mechanism to determine the lower-cost searcher,
it faces two problems. First, it has no support in the statute. Second, it
requires a highly individualized determination that creates high
administrative costs for courts. In this Part, I suggest a more
administrable alternative with statutory support.
The proposal is based on 35 U.S.C. § 287. As I describe below in
Section A, the plain text of this statutory provision imposes a duty on
all patentees to give prior notice of their patents to potential
infringers, which would normally require search. As I describe in
Section B, however, courts have ignored the plain language and
eviscerated the provision, because it conflicts with the deeply
ingrained one-sided view that says producers should always be the
187. LOUIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5 (2002) (noting that

conventional economic analysis disregards distributional concerns).
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ones doing the searching and patentees have a right to be passive.
Repudiating this erroneous one-sided view of search duty thus allows
§ 287 to be reinvigorated and helps reallocate the search duty to
patentees in an efficient way.
A. Section 287 as a Search Rule
Section 287(a) of the patent statute states:
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any
patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article into the United
States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon
the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with the number of the patent . . .
or when, from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the
package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In
the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any
action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice. 188

To parse this rather long statutory section, it first helps to
consider the penalty for noncompliance: "In the event of failure so to
mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee ... except on
proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement." Thus, § 287
imposes a duty on patentees either to mark a product, or to provide
actual notice, before infringement occurs, on pain of forfeiting
damages. The phrasing of the statute is rather awkward in the sense
that it delineates the option of constructive notice (i.e., marking)
before it delineates the option of actual notice, whereas most notice
statutes provide for actual notice before discussing constructive
notice-but it is clear enough that the statute provides these two
alternatives.
My main argument in this Section is that § 287 is best read as
a notice statute that emphasizes actual notice as the gold standard
and constructive notice (through marking) as a subsidiary alternative,
in contrast to the conventional view of § 287 as a marking statute that
emphasizes marking as the gold standard and actual notice as a
subsidiary alternative.189 The distinction matters because courts have
eviscerated § 287 through two moves: (1) courts have held there is no
188. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). A recent amendment allows the replacement of the patent
number in a mark with an internet address (which must link to a web page containing the
patent number). Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16, 125 Stat. 284, 32829 (2011). This amendment does not affect my argument here.
189. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443-46 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(referring to § 287 and its predecessor statutes as "marking" statutes).
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duty to give notice unless there is a duty to mark,190 and (2) courts
have construed the duty to mark extraordinarily narrowly. 191 My
argument is that the plain language of the statute contradicts both of
these moves.
First, the statutory language that imposes a duty to give notice
does not condition this duty on the existence of an obligation to mark;
it only conditions the duty to give notice on the fact of lack of marking.
The statute says, "In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall
be recovered by the patentee . . . except on proof that the infringer was
notified of the infringement." It does not say, "In the event of failure to
mark when there is a duty to mark," actual notice is required. The
distinction is crucial. To take an analogy, the Internal Revenue Code
conditions the duty to file a tax return (i.e., to give notice to the IRS)
on the failure to earn a taxable income of zero;192 this is completely
different from conditioning the duty to file a tax return on the breach
of a legal duty to earn a zero income. If the condition were of the latter
variety, then nobody would be obliged to file tax returns (because
nobody has a legal duty to earn a zero income).
A reader may object that the statute does say that actual notice
is required only if there is a failure to "so mark," and concededly the
"so" may be plausibly read as referring to an earlier provision of the
statute imposing a duty to mark. But the "so" could equally be taken
to refer to the manner of marking prescribed by the statute-that is,
the requirement that marking, if done, be done by including the word
"patent" and the patent number. On this reading, there is a duty to
give actual notice whenever there is a failure to mark in the manner
prescribed, whether that failure occurs because there is no product to
mark, no marking, or a nonconforming mark. As a grammatical
matter, both interpretations are plausible.
As a textual matter, however, the latter interpretation is
superior. According to the conventional interpretation, when the
statute says that patentees "may give notice" through marking, it
really means "must give notice," so that the language imposes a duty
to mark. To denote the creation of a duty to mark by the use of the

190. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936).
191. See id. at 397-98 (finding that the duty to attach a mark arises only if patentee makes
a product).
192. 26 U.S.C. § 6011 (2006) (requirement to file tax return if one is liable for a tax).
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word "may"-a word usually associated with voluntary conduct and
not legal duty-is at least somewhat strange. 193
Under my interpretation, there is no such thing as a duty to
mark. Rather, § 287 imposes a duty to give notice by the provision that
"no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement."l94 Specifying a penalty for failure to undertake certain
conduct is the classic language of imposing of a legal duty. On this
view, marking is simply one option for compliance with the more
general duty to give notice: by marking a product, the patentee "may
give notice" of his patent, and the infringer is accordingly "notified of
the infringement" at the time of such marking. But while a patentee
may comply with the duty of giving notice through marking in the
manner prescribed, the gold standard for compliance would still be
providing actual notice. This reading, where actual notice is the gold
standard and marking is an alternative, is more consistent with the
textual meaning of "may." My interpretation also gives every word in
the statute meaning, including the "so" part, rendering it consistent
with standard legal canons of textual interpretation. 195
Second, even if my interpretation is wrong, § 287 would still be
a rule that imposes the duty to give notice on patentees. Assuming for
argument's sake that the word "may" really means "must," and the
"so" refers to the duty to mark, the question becomes how far that
duty to mark extends. In Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise
Railway Equipment Co., the Supreme Court held that this duty to
mark extends only to patentees who make products.19 6 As a matter of
plain text, this narrow interpretation of the duty to mark is wrong.
On its face, the statute distinguishes between two separate
classes of people who must mark: (1) "Patentees" and (2) "persons
making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any
patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article
into the United States." The reference to "[p]atentees" is unqualified
by any requirement that patentees make an article capable of being
marked. The phrase "making.. . any patented article for or under
them" clearly modifies only the "person" and not the "patentee," since
193. Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (noting that equitable
relief is not mandatory where the patent statute provides that the court "may" grant an
injunction).

194. 35 U.S.C.

§ 287(a) (2006).

195. See Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 95, 111 (1902) ("Every word or clause in a statute is
presumed to have a meaning of its own. . .
196. 297 U.S. at 397-98.
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there is no comma after "person"; in any case, a sentence such as,
"Patentees ... making. . . any patented article for or under them,"
would be nonsensical.'97 Because, under this argument, all patentees
have a duty to mark, it follows that all patentees-even patentees who
make no products-must give notice in the absence of marking, and
once again § 287 becomes a statute that requires patentees to give
either actual or constructive notice before infringement occurs.
In sum, two judicial moves have led to the current moribund
state of § 287. First, courts have read a duty to give notice as
contingent on a duty to mark. Without this move the duty to give
notice would apply to all patentees. Second, courts have read a duty to
mark extraordinarily narrowly; otherwise the duty to mark (and its
contingent duty to give notice) would once again apply to all
patentees. Both of these moves are implausible as a matter of textual
interpretation, but courts have made them anyway. The next Section
details the motivation for courts to twist statutory text as they have:
courts have quite candidly admitted that the motivation is the deeply
ingrained view that producers should always bear the obligation of
search.
B. JudicialEviscerationof § 287
Courts have narrowed the duties imposed by § 287 in
numerous ways, but they all trace back to the Supreme Court's
decision in Wine Railway, which held that § 287 does not apply when
the patentee makes no products. 198 In response to the argument
regarding the plain text of the statute (upon which the court of
appeals being reversed had relied), the Court stated:
Obviously, but not [sic] [§ 287], a patentee might recover for all damages suffered
through infringement without giving prior actual notice to the infringer. That section
subtracts something and creates an exception.
If respondent's position is correct, process patents and patents under which nothing has
been manufactured may be secretly infringed with impunity, notwithstanding injury to
99
owners guilty of no neglect.1

The motivation of the Court in construing § 287 narrowly is
made very clear by this passage. It regards § 287 as a narrow
"exception" to a patentee's otherwise-absolute right to damages, which
is to be narrowed further because a broad construction would penalize

197. Contra id. at 395 (adopting this nonsensical reading in order to narrow
198. Id. at 397-98.
199. Id. at 395.

§

287).
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patent holders who were "guilty of no neglect." But this is begging the
question. The Court assumes that patentees who fail to provide notice
of their patents to inadvertent infringers are nonetheless blameless by
definition. This clearly reflects the one-sided assumption that
producers bear the exclusive duty of search, and patentees bear none.
Faithfully following the path blazed by the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit has grafted even more exceptions onto § 287. First, the
Federal Circuit held that a patentee who claims only a method as his
invention-as opposed to a product-need not provide notice, since it
is impossible to affix a physical mark on a method. 200 Even more
recently, the Federal Circuit has made clear that even when a
patentee claims 201 both a method and a product, and makes a patented
product, there is no need to mark that product (and thus no penalty
for failure) if he only asserts the method claim during litigation. 202
This most recent holding basically eviscerates § 287, because virtually
every patent contains method claims, and the method claims usually
provide equivalent coverage to the product claim. 203
This may seem strange to those who are unfamiliar with
patent drafting practice. But a skilled patent drafter can describe
almost any invention as either a product or a method at will. 204 For
example, suppose the invention is a wheeled cart (back in the Stone
Age). The most intuitive way of describing this invention is as a
product: "a transportation device comprising a platform supported by
wheels." But I can also describe the same invention as a method: "a
process of transporting things comprising moving a platform
supported by wheels." For all practical purposes, the first and second
claims are the same, in that both cover every likely use of a wheeled
cart, and most patents include both types of claims. But under the
Federal Circuit's holding, a patentee who asserts the method claim
200. Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
201. A patent "claim" is a one-sentence description of what the invention is, appearing at the
end of the patent and delineating the legal right. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring patentee
to list his claims to the invention).
202. Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316-17 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (holding that the marking requirement of § 287(a) cannot be violated where the
patentee asserts only method claims during litigation).
203. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629 (2008) ("Apparatus and
method claims 'may approach each other so nearly that it will be difficult to distinguish the
process from the function of the apparatus.' " (quoting United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen,
192 U.S. 543, 559 (1904))).
204. Id. at 629 n.5 (noting that " 'even the most novice claims drafter would encounter scant
difficulty in converting a patent claim from artifact to technique and back again'" (quoting John
R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules,
17 JOHN MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 225 (1998))).
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will be exempt from § 287. Since virtually any invention can be
described as a method, this holding eviscerates the statute. 205
Beyond the legalistic problem created by an interpretation that
eviscerates the statute and contradicts standard canons of
interpretation, 206 the policy problem created by Wine Railway and its
progeny is that it creates an incentive for a patentee to not produce
any products and therefore to not practice the invention. The patentee
not only has the incentive to refrain from producing any products
himself, he also has the incentive to prevent any licensee from doing
so, since licensees are also required to mark to the extent they produce
products. 207 The sum is that two bad things happen: (1) the invention
will not be legitimately used, since neither the patentee nor any
legitimate licensee will produce a product, and (2) the only people who
practice the invention are inadvertent infringers, who receive no
notice because patentees are not required to give any, and who are
then held up by the patentee after making irreversible fixed
investments.
This is the problem of patent trolls, which has been described
above, and on which there is an extensive literature. 208 The
phenomenon of patent holders making no products and providing no
notice of their patent, only to later ambush producers who
independently recreate the same invention, is well known. 209 The
policy problem is easy to state: in a case such as this, the patent does
nothing except act as a tax on subsequent development-it does not
incentivize the creation, disclosure, or commercialization of anything
useful, since the producer being ambushed is by definition unaware of
the patent and gained no technical knowledge from it (if the producer
had been aware of the patent, it would not have walked into the
holdup trap).210 A patent system that facilitates patent trolls is thus

205. Cf. id. at 630 (rejecting argument to limit exhaustion doctrine to apparatus claims
because doing so would eviscerate the exhaustion doctrine).
206. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 539 (1955) (holding that courts should
not "emasculate an entire section").
207. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the
marking requirement of § 287(a) applies to licensees).
208. See supra Part III.C.2.
209. See, e.g., Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information ProcessingPatent, 14 B.U. J. SCl. &
TECH. L. 1, 28 (2008) ("[A] patent troll is one who unfairly takes advantage of informational
asymmetries by suing independent inventors who are ignorant of the field of patents in which
the troll works.").
210. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent
Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 62 (2009).
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contradictory to the basic purpose of patents in promoting progress. 211
While the patent troll problem is well known, my point here is that
this problem should be blamed on the misallocation of search
responsibility created by such cases as Wine Railway, a point that the
literature has not considered.
C. Reinvigorating§ 287
A textual application of § 287 would impose a duty on all
patentees to give notice to infringers before infringement. If a
patentee fails to give notice, he forfeits damages until notice is given.
The required notice can be given actually or constructively through
marking. But to the extent that patentees choose to give actual notice,
it will obviously require the patentee to find the producer first.
This regime differs in several respects from the contributory
search regime I suggested earlier. First, unlike a contributory search
regime where patentees need only search when they are the lower-cost
party, the plain language of § 287 imposes a duty of giving notice on
all patentees, regardless of their cost of search. This has the potential
to create a misallocation of search duty in the opposite direction. That
is, patentees may now be required to search even when patentee
search costs are very high, and when producers might be the lowercost searchers.
The potential onerousness of an absolute duty on patentees is
mitigated, however, by the second difference, which is that the penalty
for noncompliance is much less harsh. A patentee forfeits only
damages, not a right to injunctive relief, and moreover damages are
only forfeited to the point in time when notice is given, either through
actual notice or the commencement of marking. A patentee can thus
preserve most of his remedy by giving notice even after infringement
has commenced, and the statute in fact provides that the "filing of an
action for infringement shall constitute such notice." 2 12
The fact that patentees retain their right to injunctive relief
raises the opposite concern, which is that the forfeiture of damages
may not be sufficient to deter opportunistic holdup. In cases where the
holdup strategy is sufficiently lucrative, some patentees may still
choose to engage in the patent troll tactic of hiding their patents and
giving no notice, choosing to forfeit damages in pursuit of the greater
profit from using injunctions for holdup. For example, in NTP v.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
212. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
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Research in Motion, the assessed damages of $53.7 million 213 pale in
comparison to the eventual $612.5 million settlement.
Both the possibility of too much deterrence in some cases
(where the producer is the lower-cost searcher) and insufficient
deterrence in others (where the patentee is the lower-cost searcher)
are valid concerns. The bottom line is that the § 287 route is less
theoretically perfect than a contributory search defense, where the
least cost searcher can be identified and the remedy properly tailored
on a case-by-case basis. 2 14 The counterpoint is that the § 287 route has
the advantages of lower cost of administration and more solid
statutory support, making it a more practical route for courts to
implement. 215 Overall, because patentees are likely to be the lowercost searchers quite often, 2 16 creating a robust duty to search through
§ 287 is likely to be better than the status quo where § 287 is
effectively dead and no other statutory provision requires patentee
search.
V. RECIPROCITY OF SEARCH IN OTHER PROPERTY CONTEXTS

As a matter of theory, the same one-sided view of search
pervades every area of property law. Real property law expects
someone who wants to use Blackacre to find the owner and purchase
the property before using it. Copyright law expects someone who
wishes to use a copyrighted work to find the owner and negotiate a
license before copying it. And in theory, the assumption is false in all
of these contexts. There is no intrinsic reason that a real property
owner cannot be made to find potential trespassers; and there is no
213. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
214. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 833 (2002) (arguing that the costs and benefits under
different search and liability regimes cannot be precisely quantified).
215. There is, of course, the problem that Wine Railway is a Supreme Court case, and lower
courts such as the Federal Circuit cannot directly overrule it. But a motivated lower court can
dodge a disfavored precedent in numerous ways. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON
OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72-74 (10th ed. 1996) (discussing the "honorable technique[s]" by which
lawyers and courts avoid "unwelcome precedents"). The simplest is to hold that, because Wine
Railway interpreted the predecessor statute to § 287, it does not apply to § 287 itself, which has
slightly different language. This is admittedly disingenuous because the language differences are
immaterial. But the Federal Circuit pulled precisely this trick in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool
Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where it distinguished the prior interpretation of the
prohibition on false marking (see 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006)) because the older cases arose under the
predecessor statute. Id. at 1302. This reliance on immaterial linguistic changes was clearly
motivated by the policy concern that the prior interpretation had rendered § 292 toothless. Id. at
1304. Wine Railway has rendered § 287 equally toothless.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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intrinsic reason that copyright owners cannot be made to find
potential users.
But the practical consequences of subscribing to the one-sided
view of search matters far less if the user/producer is the lower-cost
searcher in the overwhelming number of cases. The reason the
reciprocity insight has practical relevance in tort law and patent law
is that producers are not always the least cost searchers, just as
manufacturers are not always the least cost avoiders. Placing the duty
of avoidance on the wrong party in those cases then leads to inferior
social outcomes. This Part takes a brief look at the implications of the
reciprocity insight for nonpatent property.
A. Real Property
A simple observation is that real property law has long adhered
to the one-sided view of search, but we have observed very few
problems in real property as a result of the absolute allocation of
search duty to users. As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed: 'The realproperty system has no equivalent of the . . . 'patent troll.' People do
not often surreptitiously acquire land, leave it vacant, and then make
a surprise announcement of ownership only after someone else has
developed it."217 The reason is simple: in real property, the lower-cost
searcher is almost always the potential trespasser and not the
property owner.
The reasons for this are manifold, but two are most important.
Hovenkamp and others usually focus on the first: in real property, the
system of notice is better, and better notice means lower producer
search costs. 2 18 Everyone knows that Blackacre is owned, and the
owner is easy to find by looking up "Blackacre" in the local property
records office. The size and scope of the property is also easy to
demarcate with precision because land is tangible, and can be enclosed
with a literal fence. In contrast, a commercial product may not be
patented at all, and in any case one will not find the owner of a patent
covering the Blackberry by looking up "Blackberry" in the patent office
database. 219 And the "fences" that surround inventions are notoriously
217. Hovenkamp, supra note 86, at 228.
218. Id.; see also BESSEN &MEURER, supra note 2, at 8-11 (discussing the problems arising
from poor or nonexistent notice); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust:
Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 941 (2010) (arguing for the placement of "greater
responsibility on the patent applicant to communicate effective and timely notice of what he has
invented").
219. See supratext accompanying notes 76-78.

60

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 1: 1

imprecise and much less effective in providing notice to potential
infringers. 220 These differences in the infrastructure of notice make
producer/user search harder in patent law and easier in real property.
But a more important reason is the owner-to-user ratio and the
corresponding scale of a search. A piece of land usually only has one
owner but an almost unlimited number of potential users. This is
quite unlike the situation in patent law, where a single commercial
product may have zero, one, or thousands of patentees who have a
claim over it.221 And unlike the situation where a patentee can keep
most of his income just by finding a few of the most well-known
producers and letting the small fry go, the rivalrousness of land use
means that if any single trespasser is given the right to continue using
the land, the owner is necessarily deprived of that land. What this
means is that creating something akin to my contributory search
defense in real property law would then force a landowner to find
every potential trespasser ahead of time, with the same increasingmarginal-cost problem that finding the last trespasser is exponentially
harder than finding the first. Thus, quite apart from the higher
quality of notice infrastructure in real property-a problem that we
may be able to partially address in patent law with better databases
and clearer patent boundaries-the insurmountable difference in scale
is responsible for the fact that users are almost always the lower-cost
searchers in real property. And that means that, as a practical matter,
a flat rule that users have the absolute duty to search is efficient in
the real property context.
B. Copyright Law
At least one (attempted) application of the reciprocity insight in
the field of copyright law was the Google Books settlement, which was
recently rejected by a district court. 222 At the heart of the Google
Books settlement was a provision that Google would have the right to
electronically scan and store copyrighted books in its database, subject
to a copyright holder's ability to opt out of such scanning and
220. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 8-11; Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty

and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 209-10, 213 (2001).
221. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1590 (2003) (arguing that much of the patent system is built on the assumption of a "one -to-one
correspondence" between the patent and a commercial product, but that this assumption is
untrue).
222. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a
motion for final approval of the Amended Settlement Agreement (ASA)).
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storage. 223 In order to see why this provision was crucial, one must
first understand the underlying problem that the Google Books
settlement was attempting to solve, which is known in the copyright
literature as the "orphan works" problem. 224
An orphan work is one where the copyright owner cannot be
easily found. 225 An example would be a novel whose author is dead,
and whose heirs cannot be located. People who wish to use the
copyrighted work in some productive capacity (e.g., scanning the book
into the Google Books database) then have the problem that they must
search for the lost heirs.
The orphan works problem in copyright law is a mirror image
of the patent troll problem in patent law. 2 2 6 Both patent trolls and
orphan works are examples of the more general problem of holdup
threats. If the heirs of an orphan work never show up, Google would
have no problem including the novel in Google Books. The concern is
that, once the database is created, the heirs will then emerge and hold
up Google for ransom. 227
Viewed through this prism, the solution that the Google Books
settlement attempted is exactly what this Article has suggested:
reverse the search obligation. In effect, the Google Books settlement
represented a recognition that it is far easier for the owner of a
copyright to find Google and negotiate than it is for Google to find the
owner and negotiate. 228 This is especially the case because the Google
Books project was well publicized and widely known, so the
asymmetry in underlying search costs was striking.
I do not mean to unreservedly praise the Google Books
settlement. Others have pointed to potential antitrust concerns in that
the settlement would have given Google a de facto monopoly over all

223. Id. at 672.
224. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf (discussing the orphan works problem).
225. See id. (defining the term "orphan works").
226. For arguments in the copyright context that are very similar to my arguments
regarding patents, see Ariel Katz, The Orphans, The Market, and the Copyright Dogma: A
Modest Solution to a Grand Problem, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2118886.

227. See Steven Hetcher, Orphan Works and Google's Global Library Project, 8 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 21 (2007) (noting the "fear that the owner of the orphan work may
later surface and hold up the release of the transformative work").

228. See Katharina de la Durantaye, Findinga Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and
Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 229, 234-35 (2011) (noting the difficulty of locating authors).
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out-of-print books,229 an issue that is outside the scope of this Article.
My point is that, in dealing with the orphan works problem as a
search costs problem, the Google Books settlement attempted a
reversal of the search obligation in a situation where it is clearly
easier for a copyright holder to find Google than vice versa; and in this
sense it reflects precisely the reciprocity insight that I have outlined in
this Article.
This solution to an underlying economic problem, however,
immediately hit a legal brick wall. Judge Chin's opinion sets aside the
settlement, and in doing so condemns rather than praises Google for
"revers[ing] the default copyright arrangement by shifting the burden
to rightsholders to assert their rights."230 According to Judge Chin, "it
is incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the
onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when
Google copied their works without first seeking their permission." 2 3 1
As a matter of copyright doctrine, Judge Chin is on solid
ground. The assumption that users must bear the entire burden of
search and the property owner bears none-no matter how impossible
it is for the user to find the property owner and how easy it is for the
property owner to find the user-is woven deeply into the fabric of
copyright law; 2 3 2 just as it is woven deeply into the fabric of patent law
and real property law. In condemning Google's actions, Judge Chin is
merely repeating the conventional wisdom and faithfully applying
well-settled doctrinal understandings. But the whole point of this
Article is that this legalistic understanding is contrary to the
underlying economics of the situation, and the outcome of the Google
Books decision is therefore pernicious from a policy perspective. By
condemning Google's reversal of the search burden, Judge Chin has
basically ensured that no solution to the orphan works problem will be
found-by Google or by any other competitor.
The Google Books example suggests that the reciprocity insight
has much theoretical and practical relevance to copyright law. At the
same time, it is important to state here that my conclusions about the
229. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in
Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1335 (2010) (expressing concerns about the de facto
monopoly). But see Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement Is Procompetitive, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2010) (dismissing antitrust concerns and arguing instead that the Google
Settlement "expand[s] unfettered competition").
230. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting
Alessandra Glorioso, Google Books: An Orphan Works Solution, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 993
(2010)).
231. Id. at 682.
232. See Katz, supra note 226 (calling this copyright "dogma").
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relevance of the reciprocity insight to copyright law are more qualified
than in the patent context. The Google Books project was rather
exceptional in that it was widely publicized and thus the search costs
for copyright owners to find Google were likely to be very low. It is
much more difficult to say whether copyright holders in general are
usually the lower-cost searchers vis-A-vis potential users. Unlike in
the patent context, where there is often only a small number of
producers who can realistically commercialize an invention, the
potential derivative uses of a copyrighted work are very numerous,
and the number of potential users even more so. A novel may be
subject to sequels written by an almost-infinite number of potential
authors, for example, and it can also be converted into other formats
such as movies and plays, or translated into numerous languages. 233
The comparison of search costs in the copyright context thus presents
a more complicated question than in the patent context. It is not clear
that a misallocation of the search duty occurs very frequently, or that
such misallocations can be easily identified.
For this reason, my argument is not that copyright law should
necessarily change its doctrine to allocate the search duty to copyright
holders, either through a general rule or even on a case-by-case
basis. 234 The evidence does not yet support such broad conclusions. My
more limited point is that the reciprocity of search is an economic
insight that has explanatory power for theoretically analyzing the
orphan works problem in copyright law, and it also has a practical
payoff in suggesting a potential solution. In this sense, it is an insight
that makes a contribution to the copyright literature, and it is
relevant to future discussion of the orphan works problem.
CONCLUSION

This Article makes two contributions to the literature on
search and property law. First, it argues that search is a reciprocal
problem. Thus, at a minimum, those studying the problem of search
costs should at least consider both the search costs of property owners
as well as the search costs of potential infringers. Second, it argues
that, in the context of patent law, placing the search obligation on
patent holders is likely to be efficient in many cases, because
patentees are often the lower-cost searchers.
233. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (providing an exclusive right to create derivative works).
234. This marks a point of disagreement between Katz and myself. See Katz, supra note 226
(arguing for a case -by-case assessment of the lower-cost searcher).
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The first point is probably more important. Contrary to the
conventional assumption, there is no inherent reason that search
must be done by the producer. The ex ante negotiation that a
property-rule regime requires can occur as long as the parties find
each other. Whether one side or the other should have the obligation
of search depends on which side can fulfill this function more cheaply,
effectively, and efficiently. Even if one were to conclude after
conducting an empirical analysis that producers often have lower
search costs, and that the current regime is therefore correct, the
point is still that the search costs of patent owners cannot be taken for
granted but must be considered. This point is generalizable across all
property law: property owners should not be reflexively relieved of the
responsibility for search; the proper allocation is a matter of system
design and should be carefully analyzed.
The second point is that, in the patent law context, there are at
least some circumstances where the patent owner is the lower-cost
searcher and should be given the obligation to search, enforced by
some penalty for failure to comply. Given the difficulties faced by
producers in finding every patent and its owner-difficulties that have
been described by the existing patent thicket literature in detailthere is much reason to believe patentees will often have lower search
costs. Reallocating the duty of search in such circumstances will bring
greater efficiencies to the patent system.

